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THE MINNESOTA COURT ON PROXIMATE CAUSE

By WILLIAm L. PRossER*

R

in the case of Peterson v. Fulton," the supreme
court of Minnesota, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Devaney, made an attempt to reduce to a single formula all of the
perplexing problems which commonly are dealt with in connection with the term "proximate cause." Said the court:
"The best manner in which to determine whether a given act
is the proximate cause of a given result is to determine whether
that act is a material element or a substantial factor in the happening of that result."
The test here proposed was advocated by the writer of a note in a
recent volume of the MINNESOTA LAW REvIEW, 2 who derived it
from the opinion of the court in Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P.
& S. S. M. Ry.8 The court in that case affirmed an instruction
to the jury given by Judge Dancer of Duluth, who may perhaps in
turn have been persuaded by the views set forth in a noted article
in the Harvard Law Review by Jeremiah Smith.' The "substantial factor" test is approved by the Restatement of Torts,5 with
important qualifications, 6 and it is accepted by Dean Green,7 but
only as applied to the fact of causation, as distinct from further
questions of legal responsibility. It is the purpose of this article
to inquire how far the test proposed may be successful as a
general formula for the solution of the problems encountered in
this field.
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1(1934) 192 Minn. 360, 256 N. W. 901. The same test is repeated in
Guile v. Greenberg, (1934) 192 Minn. 548, 257 N. W. 649. See also Wedel
v. Johnson, (Minn. 1936) 264 N. W. 689.
2(1932) 16 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 829. This note is cited with
approval in Peterson v. Fulton, (1934) 192 Minn. 360, 256 N. W. 901.
3(1920) 146 Minn. 430, 179 N. W. 45.
'Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, (1912) 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103,
223, 5303, at p. 309.
Restatement, Torts, sec. 431: "The actor's negligent conduct is a legal
cause of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from
liability because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the
harm." The Tentative Draft of this section is cited by the court in Peterson
v. Fulton, (1934) 192 Minn. 360, 256 N. W. 901.
6Sec. 433 lists considerations which are important in determining
whether negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to
another. Secs. 440 to 452 deal with intervening factors which do or do not
relieve the actor from responsibility for harm to another, even though
his negligence is a substantial factor in bringing it about.
TGreen, Rationale of Proximate Cause, ch. 5, pp. 136-141.
ECENTLY,
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"Proximate cause" presents questions of extraordinary difficulty; most writers have concluded that they cannot be reduced
to definite rules. One may well share the reluctance of Mr. Justice
Stone to add to the already excessive literature on the subject.9
It is usually a matter of nothing more than common sense, to be
applied in the form of instructions to the jury.10 It is
"always to be determined on the facts. of each case upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent. . . . The best use that can be made of the authorities on
proximate cause is merely to furnish illustrations of situations
which judicious men upon careful consideration have adjudged to
be on one side of the line or the other."'"
It has been said that the question is essentially one of the protection to be afforded the plaintiff's interest against the risk involved
in the defendant's conduct, which must be determined upon the
facts of each case without resort to any formula. 12 Nevertheless,
any effort on the part of the court to suggest even a general guide
or approach to a problem which has arisen in more than two hundred and fifty Minnesota cases, and which never has ceased to
call forth confusion and contradictory language,"' must be received
with appreciation by the bar. An examination of the application
8
"With no regret we decline the invitation of the case to add to the
already excessive literature of the law dealing, or attempting to deal, with the
doctrine of proximate cause, much of which both 'in case and commentary
is mystifying and futile." Stone, J., in Brown v. Murphy Transfer &
Storage Co., (1933) 190 Minn. 81, 251 N. W. 5.
9
See generally Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause; Bohlen, The
Probable or the Natural Consequence as the Test of Liability in Negligence,
(1901) 47 Am. L. Reg. 79, 148; Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning
"Legal Cause" at Common Law, (1909) 9 Col. L. Rev. 13, 136; Smith,
Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, (1912) 25 Harv. L. Rev. 103, 223, 303;
Terry, Proximate Consequences in the Law of Tort, (1914) 28 Harv. L.
Rev. 10; Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, (1920) 33 Harv.
L. Rev. 633; Edgerton, Legal Cause, (1924) 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 211, 343;
Levitt, Cause, Legal Cause and Proximate Cause, (1922) 21 Mich. L. Rev.
34, 160; McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, (1925) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 149;
Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, (1932)
20 Cal. L. Rev. 229, 396, 471. Dean Green seems to have been most successful in stating the essential nature of the problem, Carpenter in reducing
the cases to more or less definite principles.
10"The question of proximate cause of an injury is often obscured by
technical learning, but in its last analysis it is ordinarily a question of fact
for the jury, to be solved by the exercise of good common sense in the
consideration of the evidence in each particular case." Healy v. Hoy, (1911)
115 Minn. 321, 132 N. W. 208. See also Schumaker v. St. Paul & Duluth
R. R., (1891) 46 Minn. 39, 48 N. W. 559. But see Green, Rationale of
Proximate Cause 122, pointing out that the court too frequently throws upon
the jury the difficult legal question of determining whether the plaintiff's
interest is entitled to legal protection against the risk.
"I Street, Foundations of Legal Liability 110, quoted in Wiles v. Great
Northern Ry., (1914) 125 Minn. 348, 147 N. W. 427.
22Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause 126-127.
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of the "material element and substantial factor" test to the cases
is not in any sense in criticism of the attempt.
A study of any substantial number of the decisions will make
it apparent that "proximate cause" is not a single problem, but
rather a group of five or six different problems; and that at least
part of the confusion may result from the fact that language appropriate to the solution of one is carried over into discussions of
others, where it not only is of no assistance, but tends to obscure
the issue. A separation of these issues may serve to explain much

that the Minnesota court has done, and to throw some light upon
questions which remain unsettled.

It would appear that a con-

sideration of "proximate cause" must necessarily involve:
(1)

The problem of the fact of causation.

(2) The problem of responsibility for events which could not
reasonably be foreseen or anticipated.
(3)

The problem of liability to persons to whom no harm

could reasonably be anticipated.
(4) The problem of intervening forces.
(5)

The problem of the amount of damages.

(6) The problem of shifting responsibility to others.
The list is by no means exclusive, and "proximate cause" has
been used in connection with many other issues ;14 but it will serve
to include all but a few of the questions which have arisen in
Minnesota.
13
See note, (1932) 16 MxNi xSYrA LAW REVIEW 829.
14For example, in insurance cases, where the essential question would
seem to be whether the risk is covered-a matter of construction of the
policy. Ermentrout v. Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1895) 63 Minn.
305, 65 N. W. 635; Russell v. German Fire Ins. Co., (1907) 100 Minn.
528, 111 N. W. 400.
Again, as to damages for breach of contract generally, the question is
whether the damages were within the contemplation of the defendant at the
time the contract was made. McCormick, The Contemplation Rule as a
Limitation Upon Damages for Breach of Contract, (1935) 19 MINNFSOrA
LAW REvIEW 497; Beaupr6 v. Pacific & Atlantic Tel. Co., (1874) 21 Minn.
155; Wilson v. Reedy, (1884) 32 Minn. 256; D. M. Osborne Co. v. Poket,
(1884) 33 Minn. 10 ("proximate consequences") ; Sargent v. Mason, (1907)
101 Minn. 319, 112 N. W. 255; Independent Groc. Co. v. Sun Ins. Co.,
(1920) 146 Minn. 214, 178 N. W. 582. Cf. Loudy v. Clarke, (1891) 43
Minn. 477, 48 N. W. ?5.
Still another question is found in cases involving violation of statutes,
namely, whether the legislature intended to protect the plaintiff against the
particular injury. See note, (1935) 19 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEw 666, 673;
cf. Frisch v. Chicago Great Western Ry., (1905) 95 Minn. 398, 104 N. W.
228; Nelson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1882) 30 Minn. 74.

MINNESOTA

I.

LAW REVIEW

CAUSATION

The simplest and most obvious problem of "proximate cause"
is that of causation. Of all the questions involved, it is perhaps
easiest to give an answer to that which traditionally is regarded
as most difficult: has the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's
loss? This is a question of fact, and one on which any layman is
quite as competent to git in judgment as the court. It is peculiarly
a question for the jury. Causation is a fact. A cause is a necessary antecedent; the term includes all things which have so far
contributed to the result that without them it would not have
occurred.'" In a philosophical sense, the causes of an accident
go back to the birth of the parties and the discovery of America;
but any attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis would
result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and would "set
society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation. ' 16 As a
practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes
which are so close to the result, or of such significance as causes,
that the law is justified in imposing liability. This limitation is not
a matter of causation, it is one of policy; and the attempt to state
1
If
it in terms of causation can lead to nothing but confusion.
the defendant excavates a hole by the side of the road, and the
plaintiff's runaway horse falls into it,' 8 it can scarcely be pretended
that the hole was not a cause of the accident, and an extremely
important one. The defendant must escape liability, if at all,
because the law imposes upon him no duty to safeguard the plaintiff against such a risk; if there was no such duty, there was no
wrongful act. On the same basis, if defendant drives through
St. Paul at sixty miles an hour, and arrives in Minneapolis in
time to be struck by a falling tree,' 9 his speed is clearly a cause
of the accident, since without it he would not have been there
when the tree fell; if he is not liable to his passenger, it is because
15"In a comprehensive sense, all the circumstances (powers, occasions.
actions and conditions) necessary to an event and necessarily followed by
it; the entire antecedent of an event; the fundamental and philsophical conception of cause; in general, whatever in reality stands in relations analogous
to those between a necessitated conclusion and its antecedent grounds."
Funk & Wagnalls, New Standard Dictionary (1923).
16Mitchell, J., in North v. Johnson, (1894) 58 Minn. 242, 59 N. W.

1012.
17Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause, p. 122.
' 8 La Londe v. Peake, (1901) 82 Minn. 124, 84 N. W. 726. Cf. Klaseus
v. Village of Kasota, (1914) 128 Minn. 47, 150 N. W. 221.
19Cf. Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, (1899) 191 Pa. St. 345, 43 AtI.
240. Also Opsahl v. Judd, (1883) 30 Minn. 126, 14 N. W. 575 (plaintiff
violating Sunday law).
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his negligence did not extend to such a risk. The term "proximate"
is applied to these more or less undefined considerations which
determine liability, even where the fact of causation is clearly
established.
So far as the simple problem of causation is concerned, the
courts of other jurisdictions have arrived at a rule, which is
commonly known as the "but for" or sine qua non rule, which
may be stated as follows: The defendant's conduct is not a cause
of the accident, if the accident would have occurred without it. 20
This rule seems nowhere to have been stated in Minnesota, but
there are cases consistent with it. 21 At most it is a rule of exclusion; if the injury would not have occurred but for defendant's
negligence, it still does not follow that there is liability. Other
considerations, which remain to be discussed, may prevent recovery.
As restricted to the question of causation alone, and regarded
merely as a rule of exclusion, the "but for" rule serves to explain
the greater number of cases, but there is one situation in which it
fails. If two causes concur to produce an injury, and either one
of them, operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the
identical result, obviously some further test is needed. Two motorcycles simultaneously pass plaintiff's horse, which is frightened
22
and runs away; either one alone would have caused the fright.
B stabs A with a knife, and C fractures A's skull with a rock;
either wound would be fatal, and A dies from the effects of both. 2
Defendant sets a fire, which combines with a fire set by another;
the combined fires burn plaintiff's property, but either one would
have done it alone. 2" Obviously, in these cases, the result would
2oSee Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause,

(1932) 20 Cal. L. Rev. 229, 396; McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, (1926)
39 Harv. L. Rev. 149, 155; Stacy v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., (1893) 84
Wis. 614, 54 N. W. 1091; Ford v. Trident Fisheries Co., (1919) 232 Mass.
400, 122 N. E. 389; Laidlaw v. Sage, (1899) 158 N. Y. 73, 52 N. E. 679,

44 L. R. A. 216.

21
Mehaler v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1908) 105 Minn.
128, 177 N. W. 250; O'Keefe v. Dietz, (1919) 142 Minn. 445, 172 N. W. 696;
Lind2 v. Great Northern Ry., (1927) 171 Minn. 486, 214 N. W. 703.
' Corey v. Havener, (1902) 182 Mass. 250, 65 N. E. 69.
28
Wilson v. State, (Tex. Cr. App. 1893) 24 S. W. 409. Accord,
Thompson v. Louisville & Nashville R. R., (1890) 91 Ala. 496, 8 So. 406,
11 L. R. A. 146; People v. Lewis, (1899) 124 Cal. 551, 57 Pac. 470, 45
L R. A. 783.
24Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1920) 146 Minn.
430, 179 N. W. 45; Borsheim v. Great Northern Ry., (1921) 149 Minn.
210, 183 N. W. 519.
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have been the same in the absence of either one of the causes; it
is equally obvious that responsibility must be attached to both.
It was in a case of this type 25 that the Minnesota court evolved
the "material element and substantial factor" test, holding each
cause responsible if it materially contributed to the result. The
test is clearly an improvement over the "but for" rule, and meets
the difficulties of the cases suggested; but in the greater number
of situations it amounts to the same thing. Except where two
causes concur and either one alone would be sufficient to produce
the result, no case has been found in which the defendant's conduct
has been regarded as a "material element and substantial factor,"
or has led to liability, if the same accident would have happened
without it.28
If defendant's negligence is a substantial factor in causing the
plaintiff's loss, it follows that he will not be absolved from liability
merely because other causes, such as the negligence of other persons, have contributed to the result.2 7 A familiar illustration is
the case where two automobiles collide and injure a bystander, or
a passenger in one of them. The law of joint tort-f easors, at least
in Minnesota, rests very largely upon recognition of the fact that
28
each of two causes may be charged with a result.
Most of the Minnesota cases dealing with the problem of causa25
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1920)
430, 179 N. W. 45.

146 Minn.

26An interesting question is raised in cases where two causes concur
to produce a result similar in kind to that which would have followed from
either cause alone, but greater in extent because of the combination of the
two. For example, Willie v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., (1933) 190
Minn. 95, 250 N. W. 5, where wmter from defendant's dam combined with
water from other sources to flood plaintiff's land. Apparently defendant
was held liable for all the damages. This is consistent with the result in
Elder v. Lykens Valley Coal Co., (1893) 157 Pa. St. 490, 27 AtI. 545, 37
Am. St. Rep. 742, which was approved by the Restatement, Torts, sec. 450.
The practical justification of the result is the difficulty of separating the
damages and assigning them to the causes.
27Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., (1888) 39 Minn. 328, 40
N. W. 160; McClellan v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry., (1894)
58 Minn. 104, 59 N. W. 978; King v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1899)
77 Minn. 104, 79 N. W. 611; Coleman v. Minneapolis Street Ry., (1911)
113 Minn. 364, 129 N. W. 762; Patry v. Northern Pacific R. R., (1911)
114 Minn. 375, 131 N. W. 462; Pelowski v. J. R. Watkins Medical Co.,
(1912) 120 Minn. 108, 139 N. W. 289, 618; Moehlenbrock v. Parke, Davis
& Co., (1918) 141 Minn. 154, 169 N. W. 541; Gowan v. McAdoo, (1919) 143
Minn. 227, 173 N. W. 440; Reader v. Ottis, (1920) 147 Minn. 335, 180
N. W. 117; Rappaport v. Stockdale, (1924) 160 Minn. 78, 199 N. W. 513;
Setosky v. Duluth, S. S. & A. Ry., (1927) 173 Minn. 7, 216 N. W. 245;
Kloss v. Minneapolis Street Ry., (1928) 174 Minn. 294, 219 N. W. 179;
Luck v. Minneapolis Street Ry., (1934) 191 Minn. 503, 254 N. W. 609;
Kunkel v. Paulson, (Minn. 1936) 266 N. W. 441.
28
See (1933) 17 MINNESoTA LAw REVIEW 109.
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tion itself have turned upon the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the fact. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, and he must
sustain it by more than mere speculation or conjecture.2 9 He must
furnish at least the basis for a reasonable inference that the injury
was due to defendant's conduct,30 and it is not enough if he leaves
the probabilities evenly balancedA1 But he need not negative
entirely the possibility of other adequate causes, 82 and circumstantial evidence 8 or the opinions of experts84 may be sufficient, if
29

Larson v. St. Paul & Duluth R. R., (1890) 43 Minn. 488, 45 N. W.
1096; O'Neill v. Johnson, (1893) 53 Minn. 439, 55 N. W. 601; Simonson v.
Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R., (1902) 88 Minn. 89, 92 N. W. 459; Thomas
v. Smith, (1903) 90 Minn. 379, 97 N. W. 141; Mageau v. Great Northern
Ry., (1907) 102 Minn. 399, 113 N. W. 1016; Bruckman v. Chicago, St. P.
M. & 0. Ry., (1910) 110 Minn. 308, 125 N. W. 263; Posch v. Payne,
(1922) 151 Minn. 111, 186 N. W. 132; McCool v. Davis, (1924) 158 Minn.
146, 197 N. W. 93; Nealis v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., (1928) 173 Minn.
587, 218 N. W. 125; Phillips v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1931) 182
Minn. 307, 234 N. W. 307; Vardolos v. Phillips Petroleum Co., (1933)
188 Minn. 25, 246 N. W. 467; O'Connor v. Pillsbury Flour Mills Co., (Minn.
1936) 267 N. W. 507.
"The burden is on plaintiff to show that it is more probable that the
harm resulted in consequence of something for which the defendant was
responsible than in consequence of something for which he was not responsible. If the facts furnish no sufficient basis for inferring which of several
possible causes produced the injury, a defendant who is responsible for only
one of such possible causes cannot be held liable." Alling v. Northwestern
Bell Tel. Co., (1923) 156 Minn. 60, 194 N. W. 313.
30McNamee v. Hines, (1921) 150 Minn. 97, 184 N. W._675. "To warrant a recovery the evidence must furnish a reasonable basis for a finding
that the accident is more likely to have resulted from the negligence alleged
than from other causes." Robertson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., (1929)
177 Minn. 303, 225 N. W. 160.
"Proof of causal connection must be something more than consistent
with plaintiff's theory of how the accident happened." Bauer v. Miller
Motor Co., (Minn. 1936) 267 N. W. 206; Schendel v. Chicago, M. & St.
P. Ry., (1925) 165 Minn. 223, 206 N. W. 436.
81
"It is, of course, not necessary to establish the connection between
cause and effect with absolute certainty, for this is often impossible. Evidence furnishing a reasonable basis for satisfying the minds of the jury that
the clogging of the netting, through the negligence of the engineer in the
management of the engine, was the proximate and operating cause of plaintiff's injury, would have been sufficient. But this conclusion must not
rest upon mere conjecture. It is not even enough that the evidence leaves
the matter in equilibrio as to whether the injury was produced by a cause
for which the defendant was responsible, or by one for which it was not
responsible; and a fortiori no recovery can be had if it is more probable
that it was produced by the latter." Mitchell, J., in Orth v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry., (1891) 47 Minn. 384, 50 N. W. 363.
82
Ominsky v. Charles Weinhagen & Co., (1911) 113 Minn. 422, 129 N.
W. 845. Cf. Restatement, Torts, sec. 432, comment c.
33Schultz v. Faribault Consol. Gas & Elec. Co., (1900) 82 Minn. 100,
84 N. W. 631; Rogers v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., (1906) 99 Minn.
34, 108 N. W. 868; Moores v. Northern Pac. Ry., (1909) 109 Minn. 100,
121 N. W. 392; La Pray v. Lavoris Chemical Co., (1912) 117 Minn. 152,
134 N. W. 313; Murphy v. Twin City Taxicab Co., (1913) 122 Minn. 363,
142 N. W. 716; Mitton v. Cargill Elevator Co., (1913) 124 Minn.65, 144
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they make it appear more probable that the injury was caused by
defendant than that it was not.
Causation alone does not determine liability. It cannot be repeated too often that other considerations remain. But it is a
necessary condition of liability; and as to causation alone the
"material element and substantial factor" test seems the most
satisfactory solution. It takes away from the jury the mysterious
words "proximate cause," and provides them instead with a guide
sufficiently clear to the layman to enable them to perform their
functions."5 No better test of causation has yet been devised.
II.

UNFORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES

A second problem which confronts the court, once the fact
of causation is established, is that of the extent to which the defendant may be held liable for consequences of his acts which he
could not reasonably have foreseen or anticipated. A typical case
may serve as an illustration. Defendant railway company maintains a station platform with a hole in it. A passenger, alighting
from a train, steps into the hole and sprains her ankle. The sprain
N. W. 434; Hedin v. Northwestern Knitting Co., (1914) 127 Minn. 369, 149
N. W. 541; Hurley v. Illinois Central R. R., (1916) 133 Minn. 101, 157
N. W. 1005; Ardell v. Great Northern Ry., (1922) 153 Minn. 191, 189
N. W. 939; Rasmussen v. George Benz & Sons, (1926) 168 Minn. 319,
210 N. W. 75; Garceau v. Engel, (1926) 169 Minn. 62, 210 N. W. 608;
Greenwood v. Jack, (1928) 175 Minn. 216, 220 N. W. 565. Cf. Home Ins.
Co. v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry., (1920) 146 Minn. 240, 178 N. W. 608,
where a verdict for the defendant was affirmed.
"The general rule of law is well understood. While the evidence in
proof of the cause of the accident may be circumstantial, it must not leave
it in the field of conjecture. The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff. It
is not enough that the evidence be consistent with the theory of the accident. It must go further-it must support it. It must justify an honest
inference. It is not enough that it suggests a possibility." Macintosh v.
Great34Northern Ry., (1922) 151 Minn. 527, 188 N. W. 551.
Bishop v. St. Paul City Ry., (1892) 48 Minn. 26, 50 N. W. 927;
Coultas v. Hennepin Paper Co., (1911) 114 Minn. 309, 131 N. W. 319;
Turner v. Minneapolis Street Ry., (1918) 140 Minn. 248, 167 N. W. 1041;
Clark v. George, (1921) 148 Minn. 52, 180 N. W. 1011; cf. Cavallero v.
Travelers Ins. Co., (Minn. 1936) 267 N. W. 370.
35
The Restatement has abandoned the use of the term "proximate
cause," and has substituted "legal cause" and "substantial factor." Restatement, Torts, sec. 431; cf. Tentative Draft No. 8, Explanatory Notes to sec.
304, pp. 96-99. Two reasons are given; first, that "Proximate" has connotations of nearness in time or space, which it is desirable to avoid; and
second, that the fact question of causation should be distinguished from the
legal problem of liability, and the use of "proximate cause" has only confused the issue. Cf. Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause, ch. 5.
Compare the statement of the court in Ray's Adm'r v. Standard Oil Co.,
(1933) 250 Ky. 111, 61 S. W. (2d) 1067, that the jury should not be given
any definition of "proximate cause" because the term has no definite meaning.

THE MINNESOTA COURT ON PROXIMATE CAUSE

27

develops into inflammatory rheumatism, which becomes endocarditis, and the woman dies. Is defendant liable for her death ?"
The defendant could reasonably foresee or anticipate that the
hole in its platform might cause some injury to passengers descending from trains. Upon no ordinary basis of human experience
could it foresee that it would cause death from ififlammation of
the heart. The question is not one of causation, for the causal
connection is clear and direct, 7 without intervening forces of any
kind. It is rather one of policy, as to whether defendant's responsibility for its admitted fault is to be extended to such results.
Negligence consists of conduct which "falls below the standard
established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk."' 8
It necessarily involves a foreseeable risk, a threatened danger of injury, and conduct unreasonable in proportion to
the danger.8 9 If the defendant could not reasonably foresee any
injury as the result of his acts, or if his conduct was reasonable
in the light of what he could anticipate, there is no negligence, and
no liability.40 What if he does unreasonably fail to guard against
foreseeable harm to the plaintiff, and consequences which could
not have been foreseen in fact result?
The Minnesota court had held quite consistently that a defendant is liable for all direct results of his original negligence, even
though they could not have been anticipated. The leading case is
Christianson v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry., 1 in which Mr.
8
6The case is Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R., (1899) 76
Minn. 90, 78 N. W. 965.
""Direct" is sometimes used in a general sense as equivalent to
"proximate." McLean v. Burbank, (1865) 11 Minn. 277 (Gil. 189); cf.
Hamilton v. Vare, (1931) 184 Minn. 580, 239 N. W. 659. In the text, it is
used to indicate a causal connection in which no active forces of external
origin intervene between the defendant's conduct and the result. An analogy
might be suggested to knocking over the first of a row of blocks, after which
all the rest fall down without the assistance of any other force. Here the
sprain caused the rheumatism, the rheumatism caused inflammation of the
heart,8 the inflammation caused the death. Nothing intervened.
BRestatement, Torts, sec. 282.
309Harper, Law of Torts, sec. 72, p. 163.
4 Freeberg v. St. Paul Plow-Works, (1892) 48 Minn. 99, 50 N. W.
1026; Briglia v. City of St. Paul, (1916) 134 Minn. 97, 158 N. W. 794;
Kieffer v. Wisconsin Ry. Light & Power Co., (1917) 137 Minn. 112, 162
N. W. 1065; Spiering v. City of Hutchinson, (1921) 150 Minn. 305, 185
N. W. 375; Kruchowski v. St. Paul City Ry., (1934) 191 Minn. 454, 254
N. W. 587; Tracey v. City of Minneapolis, (1932) 185 Minn. 380, 241
N. W. 390.
41(1896) 67 Minn. 94, 69 N. W. 640. The case is sometimes referred
to as the "three telegraph poles case." Plaintiff was riding on a handcar
on defendant's railroad. A second handcar followed sixty feet behind, in
violation of a company rule requiring handcars to keep "three telegraph poles
apart," or 540 feet. Plaintiff fell off and was injured by the second hand-
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Justice Mitchell made a statement of the rule which has been much
quoted since:
"What a man may reasonably anticipate is important, and may
be decisive, in determining whether an act is negligent, but is not
at all decisive in determining whether that act is the proximate
cause of the injury which ensues. If a person had no reasonable
ground to anticipate that a particular act would or might result
in any injury to anybody, then, of course, the act would not be
negligent at all; but, if the act itself is negligent, then the person
guilty of it is equally liable for all its natural and proximate consequences, whether he could have foreseen them or not. Otherwise
expressed, the law is that if the act is one which the party ought,
in the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated was liable to
result in injury to others, then he is liable for any injury proximately resulting from it, although he could not have anticipated the
particular injury which did happen. Consequences which follow
in unbroken sequence, without an intervening efficient cause, from
the original negligent act, are natural and proximate; and for such
consequences the original wrongdoer is responsible, even though
he could not have foreseen the particular results which did follow."
Upon this basis, the court has held the defendant liable for
physical events which could not possibly have been foreseen, 42 and
for results which have occurred in an unforeseeable manner. 3
car. A verdict for plaintiff was affirmed, against the contention that the
particular injury could not have been anticipated, and therefore the negligence of the second handcar was not the proximate cause of it.
421n Baker v. Great Northern Ry., (1901) 83 Minn. 184, 86 N. W. 82,
the defendant allowed its roadbed to become soft and springy, permitted
stone and gravel to accumulate on the track, and ran an engine with a loose
pilot. The pilot struck into the gravel, and a stone was thrown against the
cab window, breaking the glass and injuring plaintiff's eye. The defendant
was held liable, even if it was not foreseeable that the window would be
broken. "It does not appear that there was any intervening cause."
In Kommerstad v. Great Northern Ry., (1913) 120 Minn. 376, 139
N. W. 713, aff'd (1915) 128 Minn. 505, 151 N. W. 177, defendant ran a
train without giving warning signals, and apparently without keeping a
proper lookout. The train struck a horse on the track, and threw it 195
feet; it struck the plaintiff, who was thirty feet from the track, and injured
him. The court left all questions to the jury, and affirmed a verdict for the
plaintiff.
In Foss v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., (1922) 151 Minn. 506, 187 N. W.
609, one of defendant's employees was driving a pin out of a fluting iron,
using a hammer and a driving-pin which was too short. The driving-pin
flew from his hand and injured the plaintiff. A verdict for plaintiff was
affirmed. "The particular injury which resulted need not be anticipated in
order that actionable negligence be found. It is enough that some injury
was reasonably to be anticipated and that which comes results proximately."
Cf. Hansen v. St. Paul Gaslight Co., (1900) 82 Minn. 84, 84 N. W.
727, as to damages recoverable where gas from defendant's mains killed
part of the stock of plaintiff's florist establishment. The court regards the
loss in value of the remainder of the stock as foreseeable.
48 Krippner v. Biebl, (1881) 28 Minn. 139, 9 N. W. 671 (fire set by
defendant was apparently put out; it sprang up again and burned plaintiff's
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The plaintiff is permitted to recover for unusual and unexpected
consequences of personal injuries: for paralysis,4 tuberculosis, 4 5
blood poisoning," baldness,' 7 endocarditis,48 nephritis,4 pneumonia. 10 The defendant is liable where his negligence operates
upon an existing physical condition, such as pregnancy, " ' or a
latent disease 2 or susceptibility to disease,5 to produce consequences which could not have been foreseen.
No Minnesota case has been found which limits liability upon
the basis of foreseeability of the ultimate result. There is occasional language, particularly in the earlier cases, 5' which suggests
property); Hyatt v. Murray, (1907) 101 Minn. 507, 112 N. W. 881 (log
skid left projecting into roadway; a sleigh ran against the end of the skid,
throwing the other end around and injuring plaintiff); Johnson v. Oakes,
(1910) 110 Minn. 94, 124 N. W. 633 (defendant's pile driver was pulling
caps off of piles in a trestle; one pile pulled out of the ground and fell
against the engine, injuring plaintiff) ; Hoppe v. City of Winona, (1911) 113
Minn. 252, 129 N. W. 577, 33 L. R. A. (N.S.) 449 ("brush" discharge from
uninsulated wire); Prendergast v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., (1917) 138
Minn. 298, 164 N. W. 923 (plaintiff struck in the face by wires sticking out of
moving train; he jumped back, striking his back against other cars).
"4Bishop v. St. Paul City Ry., (1892) 48 Minn. 26, 50 N. W. 927.
45Healy v. Hoy, (1911) 115 Minn. 321, 132 N. W. 208.
4"Carr v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1918) 140 Minn. 91, 167
N. W.7 299.
. Ominsky v. Charles Weinhagen & Co., (1911) 113 Minn. 422, 129
N. W. 845.
48Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R., (1899) 76 Minn. 90, 78
N. W. 965.
"9Turner v. Minneapolis Street Ry., (1918) 140 Minn. 248, 167 N. W.
1041.5
oState v. James, (1913) 123 Minn. 487, 144 N. W. 216 (defendant
stabbed one Miller in the lung with a knife; Miller developed pneumonia and
died; defendant held guilty of murder). Cf. Anderson v. Anderson, (1933)
188 Minn. 602, 248 N. W. 35; but cf. Honer v. Nicholson, (Minn. 1936) 168
852.
N. W.
51
Shartle v. City of Minneapolis, (1871) 17 Minn. 308 (Gil. 284);
Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., (1892) 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034, 16
L. R. A. 203; Morris v. St. Paul City Ry., (1908) 105 Minn. 276, 117 N. W.
500; see Simonson v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R., (1902) 88 Minn. 89,
92 N.
52 W. 459.
Watson v. St. Paul City Ry., (1899) 76 Minn. 358; Watson v.
Rinderknecht, (1901) 82 Minn. 235, 84 N. W. 798; Ross v. Great Northern
Ry., (1907) 101 Minn. 122, 111 N. W. 951; Blomquist v. Minneapolis Furniture Co., (1910) 112 Minn. 143, 127 N. W. 481; Magers v. Minneapolis,
St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1910) 112 Minn. 435, 128 N. W. 576; Maroney
v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., (1913) 123 Minn. 480, 144 N. W. 149; Young
v. St. Paul City Ry., (1919) 142 Minn. 10, 170 N. W. 845; Clark v. George,
(1921)3 148 Minn. 52, 180 N. W. 1011.
5 Ludwig v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., (1911) 113 Minn. 510, 130
N. W. 5.
54Such language is found in Locke v. First Division, St. Paul & Pac.
R. R., (1870) 15 Minn. 350 (Gil. 283, 300) (dictum); Nelson v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry., (1882) 30 Minn. 74, 14 N. W. 360 (a statute violation
case; the subsequent language of Mitchell, J. in Christianson v. Chicago, St.
P. M. & 0. Ry., (1896) 67 Minn. 94, 69 N. W. 640, quoted in the text,
makes it clear that he must have been speaking of the negligence issue here) ;
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a limitation to consequences which are foreseeable, or "natural and
probable," but such statements appear to be dictum, or to be
addressed to other problems. The court apparently does not
approve the limitation suggested by the New York cases55 as to
remoteness of the result in time or space, and has cited with approval a federal case5 6 where ten years elapsed between cause and
effect. The only hint of any boundary to liability for consequences
directly caused is found in the language in Wallin v. Eastern Ry. 7
to the effect that
"A person guilty of negligence should be held responsible for
all the consequences which a prudent and experienced person,
fully acquainted with all the circumstances which in fact existed,
whether they could have been anticipated by reasonable diligence
or not, would at the time of the negligent act have thought reasonably possible to follow if they had occurred to his mind."
It is difficult to say just what this means; a person gifted with
omniscience as to all existing circumstances would of course foresee all consequences which might possibly follow. Perhaps there
is some notion of the limitation suggested by the Restatement, 8
Maher v. Winona & St. Peter R. R., (1884) 31 Minn. 401, 18 N. W. 105
(defendant liable if jury find accident reasonably to be anticipated; it is
difficult to see how any reasonable man could find anything of the qort) ;
Ransier v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., (1884) 32 Minn. 331, 20 N. W. 332
(liable "at least" for foreseeable consequences) ; Hansen v. St. Paul Gaslight Co., (1900) 82 Minn. 84, 84 N. W. 727 (liable for foreseeable consequences) ; La Londe v. Peake, (1901) 82 Minn. 124, 84 N. W. 726 (an intervening force case; the court's language apparently is addressed to the issue
of negligence) ; Grant v. City of Brainerd, (1902) 86 Minn. 126, 90 N. W.
307 (liable "at least" for foreseeable consequences); Board of County
Comm'rs v. Sullivan, (1905) 94 Minn. 201, 102 N. W. 723 (dictum); Boyd
v. City of Duluth, (1914) 126 Minn. 33, 147 N. W. 710 (considers the duty
problem, discussed in text, part III); Strobeck v. Bren, (1904) 93 Minn. 428,
101 N. W. 795 (intervening force case). Much of this language seems to be
traceable to Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Kellogg, (1876) 94 U. S.469, 24
L. Ed.
55 256.
Ryan v. New York Central R. R., (1866) 35 N. Y. 210; Bird v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., (1918) 224 N. Y. 47, 120 N. E. 86, 87;
see dissenting opinion of Andrews, J., in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R.,
(1928) 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99. The limitation has not found acceptance
outside of New York. See Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act,
(1920)
33 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 642.
5
"Western Union Tel. Co. v. Preston, (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1918) 254 Fed.
229, cited in Sporna v. J'lina, (1931) 184 Minn. 89, 237 N. W. 841, 76
A. L. R. 1280. Cf. Hyvunen v. Hector Iron Co., (1908) 103 Minn. 331, 115
N. W. 167.
57(1901) 83 Minn. 149, 158, 86 N. W. 76, 54 L. R. A. 481. The statement is taken from 1 Shearman. & Redfield, Negligence, 6th ed., sec. 20, p.
58. It has been repeated in the later cases of Baker v. Great Northern
Ry., (1901) 83 Minn. 184, 86 N. W. 82; Kommerstad v. Great Northern
Ry., (1913) 120 Minn. 376, 139 N. W. 713, aff'd (1915) 128 Minn. 505,
151 N. W. 177; Fox *v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry., (1913) 121 Minn. 511,
141 N.
5 W. 845.
sRestatement, Torts, sec. 433: "The following considerations are in
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that the defendant should not be liable for consequences which,
looking backward after the event, and with full knowledge of all
the facts, appear "highly extraordinary." This test has been criti.
cised,59 and seems not to be borne out by cases which the Restatement itself approves. 6° In any case, it seems unlikely that a court
which imposes liability where a handcar is derailed because a following handcar is short a handle. 61 where a horse struck by a train
is thrown 195 feet through the air and hits the plaintiff,62 and where
a woman loses her hair from fright, 3 would absolve a defendant
because the event is remarkable.
The "material element and substantial factor" test is of no aid
in determining these questions. But once it is determined that
a defendant is liable for unforeseeable consequences directly
caused, that test remains as a test of causation.
III.

THE UNFORESEEABLE PLAINTIFF

An entirely different problem arises where the negligence of the
defendant results in injury to a person to whom no harm could
reasonably be anticipated. Suppose that the defendant could foresee injury to A if he did not exercise proper care; he fails to use
due care, and there follows an injury to B, who was entirely outside of the area of any apparent danger? 4 The issue was presented in striking fashion to the New York court in the much
themselves or in combination with one another important in determining
whether the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm
to another: . . . (b) whether after the event and looking back from the
harm to the actor's negligent conduct it appears highly extraordinary that
it should have brought about the harm." See also Comment e.
This statement represents the views of Professor Bohlen, the Reporter
of the Restatement. See his review of Harper, Treatise on the Law of
Torts, (1934) 47 Harv. L. Rev. 556, 557. The writer has not found it set
forth by any other author.
59Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, (1932)
20 Cal. L. Rev. 229, 245, 475.
6°Particularly In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd., [1921] 3
K. B. 560, approved in Restatement, Torts, Tentative Draft No. 8, Explanatory Notes to sec. 310, p. 102.
81
'Wallin v. Eastern Ry., (1901) 83 Minn. 149, 86 N. W. 76, 54 L. R. A.
481.
62Kommerstad v. Great Northern Ry.. (1913) 120 Minn. 376, 139
N. W. 713, aff'd (1915) 128 Minn. 505, 151 N. W. 177.
O-0minsky v. Charles Weinhagen & Co., (1911) 113 Minn. 422, 129
N. W. 845.
64Cf. Ramsey v. Carolina-Tennessee Power Co., (1928) 195 N. C. 788,
143 S. E. 861, where defendant's negligence in shunting cars onto a spur
track resulted in the electrocution of a man running a laundry machine,
apparently some miles away.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
debated case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. 65 A passenger was
running to catch one of the defendant's trains. The defendant's
servants, assisting him to board it, dislodged a package from his
arms, and it fell upon the rails. The package contained fireworks,
which exploded with some violence. The concussion broke some
scales, many feet away at the other end of the platform, and they
fell upon the plaintiff and injured her. The defendant's servants
could have foreseen harm to the package, or at most to the passenger boarding the train; no injury to the plaintiff could possibly
have been anticipated.
The traditional approach to such a case would have been to
say that defendant was negligent, and its negligence directly caused
the result, therefore the defendant must be liable. This was the
decision in the Appellate Division. 8 In the Court of Appeals,
the case fell into the hands of Mr. Justice Cardozo, who proceeded
upon a different tack. Defendant was not liable, he said, because
there was no negligence toward the plaintiff. Negligence is a
matter of relation between individuals; it involves a duty to use
care, which must be founded upon the foreseeability of harm to
the person in fact injured. "Negligence in the air, so to speak,
will not do." If defendant could not reasonably foresee any injury to the plaintiff, its conduct did not become a wrong toward
her merely because it was negligence toward somebody else.
"The plaintiff sues in her own right for a wrong personal to
her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to
another."
Three judges dissented in the PaIsgraf Case. Judge Andrews,
in a vigorous opinion, contended that
"Due care is a duty imposed on each one of us to protect
society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B or C alone.
...
Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining
from those acts which unreasonably threaten the safety of others.
. . . Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be
expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he
be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone."
The controversy is one of long standing, which has occupied
many legal writers.6 7 The Restatement has adopted Cardozo's
85(1928) 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99. Discussed in (1929) 13 MiNxzEsoTA LAW REvIEw 397.
68 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., (1927) 222 App. Div. 166, 225
N. Y. S. 412.
8?The history of this controversy is reviewed in Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act, (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 449.
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position.6
Its merits are obvious, and simplicity is not the least
of them. It falls readily into line with the terms used by the.
courts, and the concept of negligence as a matter of relation. But
persuasive arguments may be advanced in favor of the opposing
view. ' 9 As between an entirely innocent plaintiff and a defendant
who admittedly has departed from a social standard of conduct,
if only toward one individual, who should bear the loss? The
plaintiff is powerless to avert the accident, the defendant could
at least avoid it by ordinary care. He is liable for unforeseeable
consequences to those within the zone of apparent danger; extension of liability to those outside it would impose no new obligation of conduct. There is an essential inconsistency in holding
a defendant who can foresee danger to A liable for unforeseeable
injuries to A, and refusing to hold him for unforeseeable injuries
to B. It is no answer to say that duty is a matter of relation between individuals. The concept of "duty" is an artificial one,
which came late in the law of negligence, as a rationalization of
what was already there.7 0 The assumption begs the question; if
liability is to be imposed, it is quite as easy to say, with Andrews,
that there is a duty to all the world. The essential question is
liability, and "duty" is one of the words with which we state our
conclusion. The problem is really one of social policy: whether
the defendants in these cases, who in large measure are railroads,
governmental bodies, automobile owners and others who by insurance, rates or taxes are in a position to distribute the risk to the
general public, 7 1 shall bear the losses of a complex civilization
rather than the individual plaintiff.72 Perhaps different answers
might well be given in different communities;73 but the issue is
not to be determined by a statement of the conclusion.
6BRestatement, Torts, sec. 281 (b), Comment c. Compare the rule as to
liability based on intent, Restatement, Torts, sec. 16 (2) and Comment b.
The illustration given is based on Talmage v. Smith, (1894) 101 Mich. 370,
59 N.9 W. 656, 45 Am. St. Rep. 414.
670Note, (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 53.
Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, (1934) 34 Col. L. Rev. 41.
Cf. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, (1928) 28 Col. L. Rev.
1014, (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 255, reprinted in Green, Judge and Jury, ch. 3.
71A count of 279 Minnesota cases on "proximate cause," cited in the
footnotes of this article, revealed the following list of defendants: railroads
and street railways 129, other public utilities 24, manufacturers, industrial
concerns and public stores 54, municipal corporations 19, automobile drivers
20, other defendants (including physicians, individual employers, charitable
corporations,
and others who might well have carried insurance) 33.
72
Note, (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 53; cf. Edgerton, Legal Cause, (1924)
72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 211, 343, 349; Green, Judge and jury 74-102.
73Compare the restricted view of liability sometimes found in the
larger industrial states, as in Ryan v. New York Central R. R., (1866) 35
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The question cannot be said to have been determined definitely
in Minnesota. There are two cases in which the court has held
definitely that there is no duty to those to whom no harm can be
anticipated. In Renner v. Canfield,74 defendant wrongfully shot
a dog in the street, and a pregnant woman, 175 feet away and out
of sight, was frightened, and her health affected. The court held
there was no liability because there was no tort against the
woman.75 In view of a later decision that there may be recovery
for fright without physical impact,76 the case seems clearly to support Cardozo's position. A more emphatic statement is found in
Boyd v. City of Duluth,7 7 where a loose timber fell from defendant's
bridge while an automobile was passing over it, and struck a
child playing below, where no child could be anticipated. It was
held that any duty to travellers passing over the bridge did not
extend to the child.
There are other cases which perhaps confirm Cardozo's view,
but might be distinguished. There is no liability for the violation
of a statute, unless the plaintiff is a member of a class intended
to be protected by the statute ;71 but the effect of a statute is a
N. Y. 210; Wood v. Pennsylvania R. R., (1896) 177 Pa. St. 306, 35 AtI.
699; Hoag v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R., (1877) 85 Pa. St. 293, with such
cases as Bond v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., (1918) 82 W. Va. 557, 96 S. E.
932, 5 A. L. R. 201; Ramsey v. Carolina-Tennessee Power Co., (1928) 195
N. C. 788, 143 S. E. 861; Crow v. Colson, (1927) 123 Kan. 702, 256 Pac.
971; Alabama Great Southern Ry. v. Chapman, (1886) 80 Ala. 615, 2 So.
738.
74(1886)
-36 Minn. 90, 30 N. W. 435.
75"The act, in itself, was not a tort of any kind against plaintiff, as the
dog was not his property. The injury to the woman would have been presumably the same whether the killing of the dog was lawful or unlawful,
and whether the defendant had fired at the dog, or at a bird in the air.
If the acts of defendant amounted to any tort which, in any possible view of
the case, could be held to be the proximate cause of the injuries complained
of, the gist of it must be negligence in shooting in such proximity to a human
residence as might naturally and reasonably be anticipated to be liable
to injure the inmates by fright or otherwise." Renner v. Canfield, (1886)
36 Minn. 90, 92, 30 N. W. 435.
76Purcell v. St.. Paul City Ry., (1892) 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034,
16 L. R. A. 203. See also Johnson v. Sampson, (1926) 167 Minn. 203, 208
N. W. 814.
77(1914) 126 Minn. 33, 147 N. W. 710. The court said, at p. 37. "If
the conduct complained of be not wilful, it must constitute negligence, and
the legal concept of the latter is composite and correlative, involving not
only conduct with respect to some subject matter but also a duty to the
person injured, or some class to which he belongs, of which the conduct
constitutes a violation; and such duty, furthermore, when not specifically
defined, is not to guard against all possible consequences of the conduct, but
only against those which may reasonably be anticipated." Apparently to the
same effect is McGillivray v. Great Northern Ry., (1920) 145 Minn 51, 176
N. W. 200.
78
Akers v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry., (1894) 58 Minn. 540, 60 N. W.
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matter of presumed legislative intent, and statutes are to be construed strictly. A contract gives no right of action to one not a
party to it ;70 but contract obligations are voluntarily assumed, and
are more limited in their scope than tort duties. 0 The duties of a
landowner to those rightfully upon the premises do not extend to
trespassers;"' but a trespasser, when he enters where he has no
legal right, assumes the risk of what he may encounter, and the
landowner is relieved of the responsibility of looking out for him.
It has been held that there can be no recovery for the effects of
fright at the peril of another ;82 but the reluctance of the courts
to permit recovery for "mental anguish" suggests that it may
be the character of plaintiff's injury which prevents recovery. It
is difficult to generalize upon the basis of such decisions.
On the other hand, there are cases s in which the court has sus669; Hamilton v. Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., (1899) 78 Minn. 3, 80 N. W.
693; Fezler v. Willmar & Sioux Falls Ry., (1902) 85 Minn. 252, 88 N. W.
746; Everett v. Great Northern Ry., (1907) 100 Minn. 309, 111 N. W. 281:
Westlund v. Iverson, (1922) 154 Minn. 52, 191 N. W. 253; Landy v. Olson
& Serley Sash & Door Co., (1927) 171 Minn. 440, 214 N. W. 659. The
problem is discussed in the note, (1935)

19 MINNESOTA LAw REvmw 666,

667-672.
7
9Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 10 Mees. & W. 109, 11 L. J. Ex.
415, discussed in Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors,

(1925) 10 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 1; see Sawyer v. Minneapolis & St.
Louis Ry., (1888) 38 Minn. 103, 35 N. W. 671; Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co..
(1892) 49 Minn. 331, 51 N. W. f103; O'Brien v. American Bridge Co.,
(1910) 110 Minn. 364, 125 N. W. 1012.
B0 See McCormick, The Contemplation Rule as a Limitation Upon
Damages for Breach of Contract, (1935) 19 MINNESOTA LAW RFviEw 497.
B1See Wickenburg v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1905) 94
Minn. 276: "If a recovery may be had by a person occupying the position
plaintiff did-riding upon the steps of the Omaha train without the knowledge
or consent of the company-then the individual known to the world as the
'tramp,' riding upon the brake beams under the car, would be equally
entitled to recover; and the courts would hesitate long, in an extreme case
of that kind, to declare that he was entitled to recognition." Cf. Trask v.
Shotwell,
(1889) 41 Minn. 66, 42 N. W. 699.
82
Bucknam v. Great Northern Ry., (1899) 76.Minn. 373; Sanderson
v. Northern Pac. Ry., (1902) 88 Minn. 162, 92 N. W. 542; see Keyes v.
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., (1886) 36 Minn. 290; (1935) 19 MIxNFSOTA
LAw8 3REVIEw 806.
The outstanding case is Kommerstad v. Great Northern Ry., (1913)
120 Minn. 376, 139 N. W. 713, aff'd (1915) 128 Minn. 505, 151 N. W. 177,
where plaintiff, working thirty feet from a railroad track, and apparently in
a position of safety, was struck by a horse thrown 195 feet through the air.
The court said the questions of negligence and causation were for the jury.
Accord, Alabama Great Southern Ry. v. Chapman, (1886) 80 Ala. 615, 2
So. 738. Contra, Wood v. Pennsylvania R. R., (1896) 177 Pa. St. 306, 35
At. 699.
In Wallin v. Eastern Ry., (1901) 83 Minn. 149, 86 N. W. 76, 54
L. R. A. 481, plaintiff was riding on a handcar, which was derailed when
struck by a following handcar, on which one front handle was missing. The
court said that it might be conceded that it could not be anticipated that the
absence of a handle from one handcar would derail another, but that the
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tained recovery on the part of a plaintiff to whom no injury was
reasonably to be foreseen. These cases, upon their facts, apparently are opposed to the Palsyraf Case. It is possible to dispose of
them upon the ground that the question of the unforeseeable plaintiff never was raised, and the court never saw the point. They
proceed, however, upon the theory that the defendant was originally at fault, and his negligence "proximately caused the result."
The law in Minnesota seems still to await a careful consideration of
the problem, and a definite decision.
The Restatement has gone beyond the holding of the Palsgraf
Case, and requires that the defendant foresee a risk of harm to the
particular interest of the plaintiff which is in fact invaded.s* Thus
defendant was negligent, since it might be anticipated that the absence of
the handle might occasion delay in removing the defective handcar from
the track, and so cause injury. In other words, plaintiff is permitted to
recover because injury was foreseeable to employees on the second handcar, or to persons on trains.
In Baker v. Great Northern Ry., (1901) 83 Minn. 184, 86 N. W. 82,
the plaintiff, riding in an engine cab, was injured when the pilot, running
over a springy roadbed on which gravel had been allowed to accumulate,
threw a stone against the cab window. Apparently the court assumed that
no injury to a person in the cab could be anticipated. Defendant was
held liable for the "direct result of its negligent acts."
Compare also Hyatt v. Murphy, (1907) 101 Minn. 507, 112 N. W.
881 (plaintiff injured when a sleigh ran into one end of a log-skid left projecting into the roadway, and threw the other end against him); ButlerRyan Co. v. Williams, (1901) 84 Minn. 447, 88 N. W. 3 (defendant
negligently handled a tow passing through a canal; a steamer was compelled to turn out, and ran into plaintiff's piling); Dugan v. St. Paul &
Duluth R. R., (1889) 40 Minn. 544, 42 N. W. 538, aff'd (1890) 43 Minn.
414, 45 N. W. 851 defendant blew a whistle, in violation of an ordinance, and
frightened a team of horses standing in the street, who ran away and struck
the plaintiff). It is not clear in these cases whether the court considered
that injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable. See also Draves v. Minneapolis & St. Paul Suburban R. R., (1919) 142 Minn. 321, 172 N. W. 128
and the discussion of the rescue cases in the note, (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev.
53, 58.
It is assumed, of course, that the foreseeable risk may extend to a very
large class of persons. Thus a power company which is negligent in handling its wires may foresee injury to any person using electric appliances,
or within the range of possible contact. Gilbert v. Duluth General Elec. Co.,
(1904) 93 Minn. 99, 100 N. W. 653; Bardon v. Northwestern Tel. Exch.
Co., (1904) 93 Minn. 421, 101 N. W. 1132; Drimel v. Union Power Co.,

(1918) 139 Minn. 122, 165 N. W. 1058; Anderson v. Eastern Minn. Power
Co., (Minn. 1936) 266 N. W. 702. Such cases apparently do not present

the problem of the unforeseeable plaintiff.
84Restatement, Torts, sec. 281, Comment g, Illustration 3. This seems
to be based on Cardozo's intimation in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., (1928)
248 N. Y. 339, 346, 162 N. E. 99, that "There is room for argument that a
distinction is to be drawn according to the diversity of interests invaded
by the act, as where conduct negligent in that it threatens an insignificant
invasion of an interest in property results in a unforeseeable invasion of an
interest of another order, as, e.g., one of bodily security."
Compare the comment of Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences
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if injury is to be anticipated only to plaintiff's property, he cannot
recover for personal injuries which result. Apart from the statute cases,85 which again may be referred to legislative intent, there
is no hint of any such limitation in Minnesota, and the contrary
result seems to have been reached in Lesch v. Great Northern
Ry.,8 6 where plaintiff recovered for mental anguish resulting from
invasion of her property.
It should be obvious that the "material and substantial factor"
test throws no light on these problems, and tends only to obscure
the issue. Causation is not involved, and the real question is the
extent of the defendant's original obligation.
IV.

INTERVENING FORCES

Thus far it has been assumed that the causal connection is
direct,87 without the intervention of any external forces between
defendant's conduct and the result. Intervening forces introduce
a further problem, as to whether defendant is to be relieved from
liability for an injury to which he has in fact contributed, by a
superseding cause for which he is not responsible. "Intervening
force" is a term easier of comprehension than of exact definition.
An intervening force is one which comes into active operation in
producing the result, after the defendant's negligence. 8
"Intervening" is used in a time sense; it refers to later events. Conditions existing and forces already in operation at the time of defendant's conduct are not included within the term. If defendant
sets a fire, with a strong wind blowing at the time, which carries
of a Negligent Act, (1930) 39 Yale L. J.449, 467: "If the courts once adopt
such a distinction, then we are faced with the terrifying prospect of a whole
new series of cases in which it will be necessary to consider whether or not
a person has the same interest in his foot and his eye, in his two adjoining
houses, in his ship and the cargo which it carries. Obviously a single distinction between bodily security on the one hand and property security on
the other,
would be too broad."
8
5Nelson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1882) 30 Minn. 74, 14 N. W.
360; cf. Westlund v. Iverson, (1922) 154 Minn. 52, 191 N. W. 253. See Note,
1935) 19 MINNESOTA LAW REvImw 666, 673-5.

86(1906) 97 Minn. 503, 106 N. W. 955. The contention of the Restatement apparently is advanced by the dissenting opinion of Jaggard, 3.,
and is rejected by the majority.
87
See footnote 37.
88
"An intervening force is one which actively operates in producing
harm to another after the actor's negligent act or omission has been committed." Restatement, Torts, sec. 441. "An intervening force is a force
which is neither operating in the defendant's presence, nor at the place
where the defendant's act takes effect at the time of the defendant's act,
but comes into effective operation at or before the time of the damage."
McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, (1925) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 149, 159.
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the fire to plaintiff's property, the wind does not intervene, since
it was already in operation; but if the fire is set first, and the wind
springs up later, it is then an intervening force.89 Neither are
forces caused or set in motion by the defendant himself to be considered as intervening, since they proceed directly from the defendant's conduct, and he is to be charged with their results.90 The
distinction is doubtless an academic one, but it is useful in dealing with the type of case where a new and independent cause acts
upon a situation created by the defendant. 91
It must be conceded that "intervening force" is a highly unsatisfactory term, since we are dealing with problems of responsibility, and not physics. It is used in default of a better. It
should be understood in the very general sense of concurring92
causes of either natural or human origin, which come into active
operation at a later time to change a situation once created by the
defendant.
In considering intervening forces, it is convenient to classify
the cases according to the foreseeability of the force which intervenes, and the foreseeability of the ultimate result.
A. Foreseeable Intervening Forces. If the intervening force
89
Compare Johnson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1883) 31 Minn. 57,
16 N. W. 488, with Russell v. German Fire Ins. Co., (1907) 100 Minn. 528,
111 N. W. 400.
90"The new, independent, intervening cause must be one not produced
by the wrongful act or omission, but independent of it, and adequate to
bring about the injurious result." Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., (1892) 48
Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034, 16 L. R. A. 203. Thus if defendant stabs
plaintiff with a knife, and pneumonia germs enter plaintiff's lungs on the
blade of the knife, there is no intervening force, for defendant has directly
caused the pneumonia. State v. James, (1913) 123 Minn. 487, 144 N. W.
216. But if defendant's act causes only a weakened condition, and pneumonia germs thereafter enter plaintiff's body from another source, there
is an intervening force. Cf. Anderson v. Anderson, (1933) 188 Minn.
602, 248 N. W. 35. Both cases may result in liability, but different problems are involved.
91
Intervening forces are considered in some detail in Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 633; McLaughlin,
Proximate Cause, (1925) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 149; Carpenter, Workable Rules
for Determining Proximate Cause, (1932) 20 Cal. L. Rev. 229, 396, 471,

at pp. 476-539.

See also the Note, (1925)

9 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 273.

92To avoid confusion as to "concurring causes" and "intervening forces,"
it should be stated that, in the text, all causes, intervening or otherwise,
which materially contribute to the result are referred to as "concurring,"
while only those which come into active operation later in point of time
are called "intervening." It is, of course, entirely possible that each of two
concurring causes may be an intervening force as to the other. For example,
suppose that each of two defendants leaves an automobile at the top of a
hill without setting the brakes. The two cars run down hill and collide at
the bottom, and one of them is deflected so that it injures the plaintiff. Each
car has intervened after the original negligence connected with the other;
both are concurring causes.
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is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, the defendant may be negligent because he failed to
guard against it. One who sets a fire may foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind will spread it beyond his own
property. 3 One who allows dry grass to accumulate upon a
railroad right of way may foresee that sparks from an engine will
set it on fire.9 4 One who leaves uninsulated wires where people
may come in contact with them may anticipate that they will do so
as a result of their own acts.99 One who negligently drives an
automobile may anticipate that other vehicles will be driven so as
to collide with him."' A defendant who has a hole in his floor
may expect that some person walking by will catch his heel in
it." An unguarded elevator shaft involves the risk that others
may fall into it;98 unprotected dangerous machinery means that
someone may be caught in it. 9 If a gun is entrusted to a minor,
it may be foreseen that he will shoot himself or another. 100 In
all of these cases there is an intervening force concurring with
the defendant's conduct to cause the result; and in each case the
defendant's negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff
against that very risk.
Obviously a defendant cannot be relieved from liability by
the materialization of the risk to which he has subjected the plaintiff. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of defendant's original fault. The Minnesota court has held with a
fair degree of consistency that a defendant is liable for the effects
93Cf. Krippner v. Biebl, (1881)

28 Minn. 139, 9 N. W. 621; Russell v.

German Fire Ins. Co., (1907) 100 Minn. 828, 111 N. W. 400.
94Heron v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry., (1897) 68 Minn. 542,
71 N. W. 506; cf. Patry v. Northern Pacific R. R., (1911) 114 Minn. 375,
131 N. W. 462.
95
Steindorff v. St. Paul Gaslight Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 496, 100 N. W.
221; Musolf v. Duluth Edison Elec. Co., (1909) 108 Minn. 369, 122 N. W.
499; Davidson v. Otter Tail Power Co., (1921) 150 Minn. 446, 185 N. W.
644; Thornton Bros. Co. v. Northern States Power Co., (1922) 151 Minn.
435, 186 N. W. 863, 187 N. W. 610; Pattock v. St. Cloud Public Service Co.,
(1922) 152 Minn. 69, 187 N. W. 969; Faribault v. Northern States Power
Co., (1933) 188 Minn. 514, 247 N. W. 680.
96
Rappaport v. Stockdale, (1924) 160 Minn. 78, 199 N. W. 513.
97
Hastings v. F. W. Woolworth Co., (1933) 189 Minn. 523, 250 N. W.
362.

98

Landy v. Olson & Serley Sash & Door Co., (1927) 171 Minn. 440,
214 N. W. 659.
9
OBredeson v. C. A. Smith Lumber Co., (1904) 91 Minn. 317, 97 N. W.
977; Carlin v. Kennedy, (1906) 97 Minn. 141, 106 N. W. 340; Nelson v.
William H. Ziegler Co., (1933) 190 Minn. 313, 251 N. W. 534.
10
Anderson v. Settergren, (1907) 100 Minn. 294, 111 N. V. 279;
Kunda v. Briarcombe Farm Co., (1921) 149 Minn. 206, 183 N. W. 134.
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of such forces upon the situation he has created; or, in the words
of Mr. Justice Loring :101
"The rule seems to be well established that if the occurrence
of the intervening cause might reasonably have been anticipated,
such intervening cause will not interrupt the causation between the
original cause and the injury."
It is not always easy to trace this principle through the cases,
and occasionally it would appear that "foreseeable" must be interpreted in a rather liberal sense to bring the case within any such
rule. Considering only the conclusions reached, we may agree
that a defendant should anticipate ordinary forces of nature, such
as wind and rain ;102 that one who leaves an obstruction on a
road 1 3 or a railroad track 0 4 may foresee that a vehicle or a train
will run into it; that if defective goods are sold to a dealer, he may
be expected to resell them ;1o0 that if a train is run without warning signals, it is to be foreseen that an automobile will drive onto
the crossing ahead of it ;100 that workmen who are furnished with
a defective appliance may be expected to try to make it work ;2o7
10oFerraro v. Taylor, (Minn. 1936) 265 N. W. 829. To the same effect
is the language in Tozer v. Michigan Central R. R., (1917) 195 Mich. 662,
162 N. W. 213, quoted in Rothenberger v. Powers Fuel, Feed, Transfer &
Storage Co., (1921) 148 Minn. 209, 181 N. W. 641, and again in Pattock v.
St. Cloud Public Service Co., (1922) 152 Minn. 69, 187 N. W. 969: "If a
man does an act and he knows, or by the exercise of reasonable foresight
should have known, that in the event of a subsequent occurrence, which is
not unlikely to happen, injury may result from his act, and such subsequent
occurrence does happen and injury does result, the act committed is negligent, and will be deemed to be the proximate cause of the injury."
lO2Krippner v. Biebl, (1881) 28 Minn. 139, 9 N. W. 671; Russell v. German Fire Ins. Co., (1907) 100 Minn. 528, 111 N. W. 400; Willie v. Minnesota Power
& Light Co., (1933) 190 Minn. 95, 250 N. W. 5.
'o0 34 H-yatt v. Murray, (1907) 101 Minn. 507, 112 N. W. 881.
' Martin v. North Star Iron Works, (1884) 31 Minn. 407, 18 N. W.
109. "If the material was so piled as to create a danger, such as an ordinarily prudent person might foresee, that the material would be caught and
pushed along in a dangerous manner, so piling it was an act of negligence
as to all who might usually be within the reach of the conseqtuences that
might0 5be apprehended."
Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., (1909) 107 Minn. 104.
119 N. W. 428. Cf. Ellis v. Lindmark, (1929) 177 Minn. 390, 225 N. W.

395.
245.

25oSetosky v. Duluth, S. S. & A. Ry., (1927)
07

173 Minn. 7, 216 N. W.

1 In Arko v. Shenango Furnace Co., (1909) 107 Minn. 220, 119 N. W.
789, the defendant furnished an ore car with a defective brake. Plaintiff,
a workman, was ordered to stop the car, and tried to do so with a pinch
bar, not having been warned of the danger. It was held that the defendant's
negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries.
In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Great Northern Ry., (1928) 174 Minn. 466,
219 N. W. 755, defendant supplied a hopper-bottom car with a ratchet device
missing, to be unloaded by employees. Plaintiff's insured tried to unroll
the shaft with a wrench. The doors dropped, causing the shaft to revolve
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that if defendant publishes a libel, it is foreseeable that somebody
will mail it to the plaintiff's friends ;1o8 that someone is likely to try
to move a piano, and to be injured if it has a defective caster.""5
Such cases offer no great difficulty. Perhaps also it is not
unreasonable to say that when a train is run with defective brakes,
it may be expected to break in two, and that when the forward
part is stopped, the rear end will run into it ;11o or, in communities
where houses occasionally are moved about the streets, that workmen on such a house might be expected to come into contact with
elevated electric wires."'

And when children are in the vicinirapidly; the wrench was jerked out of his hands and fractured his skull.
The court said: "Where the situation resulting from the original negligence
is the inducing cause of the intervening act, such intervening act will not
break the causal connection between the original negligence and the injury,
nor absolve the original tort-feasor from liability if in the exercise of reasonable foresight he could have anticipated that the situation so created might
lead to an act likely to result in harm to someone .... Whether defendant
ought to have anticipated that when the employes of the foundry company
found this device missing they might attempt to dump the load in the usual
manner by using some other instrumentality to roll the shaft from beneath
the doors was, we think, a question for the jury and should have been
snlbmitted to them."
' 0 sZier v. Hofflin. (1885) 33 Minn. 66 ("a natural consequence").
1
°1Geiger v. Simpson M. E. Church, (1928) 174 Minn. 389, 219 N. V.
463, 62 A, L.R. 716.
Other cases which might be listed as reasonably clear are Jacobson v.
Great Northern Ry.. (1912) 120 finn. 12. 139 N. W. 142 (defendant furnished plaintiff with a defective lantern, and he fell off a ladder in the dark) ;
Gowan v. McAdoo, (1919) 143 'Minn. 227, 173 N. W. 440 (defendant maintained planking at a crossing below the required level; the runners of a
sleigh driven over the rails were stuck and the driver was hit by a train) ;
Greenwood v. Jack. (1928) 175 Minn. 216, 220 N. W. 565 (defendant
repaired the timing gear on plaintiff's Ford; he left out a cotter key, as a
result of which, when plaintiff cranked the car it backfired and broke his
arm) ; Evans v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., (1909) 109 Minn. 64, 122 N. W.
876, 22 L. R. A. (N.S.) 278 (defendant transported a horse into the
state without inspection for glanders in violation of statute; plaintiff bought
the horse from the owner, and it was killed by state authorities) ; Wickham
v. Chicago, St. P. M,. & 0. Ry., (1910) 110 Minn. 74, 124 N. W. 639
(defendant ordered an inexperienced laborer to repair a floor under a car
propped up for repairs, without warning the car repair crew to look out for
him; they dropped car sills on him, and he was killed) ; Gillespie v. Great
Northern Ry., (1913) 124 Minn. 1, 144 N. W. 466 (defendant failed to warn
an employee working on a semaphore pole of blasting operations in his
neighborhood) ; Seewald v. Schmidt, (1914) 127 Minn. 375, 149 N. W. 655
(defendant operated a gasoline concrete niixer without muffling the exhaust;
the noise frightened a horse, which ran away and injured plaintiff's horse) ;
Dugan v. St. Paul & Duluth R. R., (1889) 40 Minn. 544, 42 N. W. 538,
aff'd (1890) 43 Minn. 414, 45 N. W. 851 (defendant blew a whistle, in
violation of an ordinance, frightening a team of horses in the street, who
ran away and injured plaintiff).
110 Ransier v. 'Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., (1884) 32 Minn. 331, 20
N. W. 332.
111
Thornton Bros. Co. v. Northern States Power Co., (1922) 151 Minn.
435, 186 N. W. 863, 187 N. W. 610; Faribault v. Northern States Power
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ty, much might be expected of them which could not be anticipated
on the part of adults."12 The "attractive nuisance" cases rest
primarily upon the foreseeability of intervening acts of children
who are too ignorant to protect themselves against a risk obvious
to the defendant. 13
Co., (1933) 188 Minn. 514, 247 N. W. 680. Compare Bunten v. Eastern
Minn. Power Co., (1929) 178 Minn. 604, 228 N. W. 332, where defendant
maintained an uninsulated power line at a height of 253/2 feet above a spur
track, and a workman on the boom of a road building machine 20 feet high
was injured by coming in contact with it. The court held that defendant
was not negligent, since it could not anticipate any injury.
Other cases where, although there is room for argument, the intervening force seems foreseeable, are Taylor v. Northern States Power Co.,
(1935) 196 Minn. 22, 264 N. W. 139 (defendant maintained a waxed linoleum
floor, not dangerous in itself; customers tracked snow in upon it and made it
slippery, and plaintiff slipped and was injured); Anderson v. Anderson,
(1933) 188 Minn. 602, 248 N. W. 35 (plaintiff was injured in an automobile
accident through defendant's negligence; there was medical testimony that
she was so weakened as to be especially susceptible to pneumonia, which
caused her death). This last case is in accord with Restatement, Torts,
sec. 458, which distinguishes between diseases especially likely to be contracted by those with lowered vitality, and diseases equally likely to attack
healthy persons. But cf. Honer v. Nicholson, (Minn. 1936) 268 N. W. 852.
1121n Vills v. City of Cloquet, (1912) 119 Minn. 277, 138 N. W. 33,
defendant left dynamite fuse caps in an unused tool house, with a hole in
the foundation, where boys were known occasionally to play. Two boys
entered through the hole, took out some caps, and threw them at a companion. Two days later plaintiff's six-year old son found one of the
caps and hammered it with a stone to "flatten it out." It exploded and
injured his eye. The court said: "We think the evidence fully justified the
jury in finding that defendant ought to have anticipated that children might
enter the shed, get into the box of caps left exposed on the shelf, leave
some of them around where they might be found by other children, and
that injury might result. In other words, the finding that defendant was
negligent is sustained by the evidence."
In Rothenberger v. Powers Fuel, Feed, Transfer & Storage Co., (1921)
148 Minn. 209, 181 N. W. 641, defendant left a skid in an alley where
children were accustomed to play. Plaintiff's child got on top of the skid,
and it toppled over and injured him. Defendant's negligence was held to be
a question for the jury.
In Bergman v. Williams, (1927) 173 Minn. 250, 217 N. W. 127, defendant left an automobile on a down grade with the brake set and the
wheel turned against the curb, but with a three-year-old child on the sidewalk. The child climbed into the car and succeeded in starting it down the
hill, and it injured plaintiff's child. Judgment upon a verdict for defendant
was affirmed; the court approved an instruction that defendant was not
liable unless they found that she should have anticipated that the child was
likely to climb into the car, and by playing with the wheel release it so that
it would run down the hill.
"13 Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., (1875) 21 Minn. 207; Mattson
v. Minneapolis & North Wis. R. R., (1905) 95 Minn. 477, 104 N. W. 443;
Decker v. Itasca Paper Co., (1910) 111 Minn. 439, 127 N. W. 183; Berg
v. B. B. Fuel Co., (1913) 122 Minn. 323, 142 N. W. 321; Znidersich v.
Minnesota Utilities Co., (1923) 155 Minn. 293, 193 N. W. 440. See the
excellent statement of the principle by Mr. Justice Olson, in Gimmestad v.
Rose Bros. Co., (1935) 194 Minn. 531, 261 N. W. 194. See also Bauer,
The Degree of Danger and the Degree of Difficulty of Removal of the
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But it certainly is going rather far to say that the defendant
should anticipate a runaway horse which he has done nothing to
frighten ;114 or that one who leaves an empty paint drum capable
of generating explosive gas should foresee that somebody will try
to cut out the head of it with a chisel. 1
Other cases which seem to call for at least a broad definition
of "foreseeability" involve the voluntary defensive efforts of the
plaintiff and others to avert a danger or remedy a situation created
by the defendant. If defendant sets a fire which threatens plaintiff's property, the reasonable attempts of the plaintiff to put it
out do not break the causal connection in case he is injured.118 So
where a steamboat is turned into piling to avoid a collision,"'
where plaintiff jumps from a train to avoid threatened injury,"'
and where a workman to whom defendant has failed to furnish
transportation walks nine miles in cold and dangerous weather to
find shelter."10 Attempts on the part of strangers to rescue perDanger as Factors in "Attractive Nuisance" Cases, (1934) 18 MINNESOTA
LAw REvIEw 523.
"14Grant v. City of Brainerd, (1902) 86 Minn. 126, 90 N. W. 307; McDowell v. City of Preston, (1908) 104 Minn. 263, 116 N. W. 470; Klaseus v.
Village of Kasota, (1914) 128 Minn. 47, 150 N. W. 221. Compare the
cases where the horse might reasonably be expected to take fright at
defendant's train. Maher v. Winona & St. Peter R. R., (1884) 31 Minn.
401, 18 N. W. 105; Savage v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1884) 31 Minn.
419, 18 N. W. 272; Campbell v. City of Stillwater, (1884) 32 Minn. 308,
20 N. W. 320, 50 Am. St. Rep. 567. Even these cases seem to strain
"foreseeability"
to the breaking point.
" 5 Reichert v. Minnesota Northern Natural Gas Co., (1935) 195 Minn.
387, 263 N. W. 297. Perhaps this case and those cited in footnote 114 may
be explained on the basis of foreseeability of the ultimate result, rather
than of the intervening force. See the discussion below in part C, p. 53.
Another case which is very difficult to explain is Clapper v. Dickinson,
(1917) 137 Minn. 415, 163 N. W. 752, where defendant left a car with a
defective coupler upon a grade, with the wheels blocked, but without setting
the brakes. A second car was switched against it, the coupler failed to
operate, and the blocks were knocked out. The second car started down
the grade; plaintiff, the switching foreman, believed it to have defective
brakes from the actions of a switchman on top, and tried to block the front
wheels. The first car, also running down grade, struck the second one, and
ran it over plaintiff's leg. The jury's finding that the defective coupler was
the "proximate cause" of the injury was affirmed. It can scarcely be suggested that such intervening forces were to be foreseen. The case must
be supported, if at all, on the ground that the Safety Appliance Act was
intended to protect against all injuries resulting from defective couplers,
and there was causation in fact. But cf. Wiles v. Great Northern Ry.,
(1914) 125 Minn. 348, 147 N. W. 427, reversed (1916) 240 U. S. 444, 36
Sup. Ct.
406, 60 L. Ed. 732.
116 Berg v. Great Northern Ry., (1897) 70 Minn. 272, 73 N. W. 648
(dictum; a finding of contributory negligence was sustained by the evidence).
117Butler-Ryan Co. v. Williams, (1901) 84 Minn. 447, 88 N. W. 3.
11sSmith v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry., (1883) 30 Minn. 169,
14 N. W. 797.
119 Schumaker v. St. Paul & Duluth R. R., (1891) 46 Minn. 39, 48 N. W.
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sons or property from peril created by the defendant fall into
the same category. 2 0 Again, it is commonly held that if defendant
inflicts injuries upon the plaintiff, he is liable for the results of
negligent treatment by a physician, provided that the1 21plaintiff
himself was not at fault in the choice of the physician.
It must be conceded that such cases call for more of an imagination to anticipate the intervening force than the ordinary "risk
of injury" which is the basis of negligence actions. At the same
time, such events cannot be classed as definitely unforeseeable,
559. Cf. Bergquist v. Kreidler, (1924) 158 Minn. 127, 196 N. W. 264
(litigation
to protect supposed legal rights).
120 1n Griggs v. Fleckenstein, (1869) 14 Minn. 81 (Gil. 62), defendant
left his horses unhitched in the street. They ran away, and a crowd of
persons tried to stop them by yelling and waving their hats. They swerved
and ran into plaintiff's horse. The court said: "All the consequences which
actually resulted in this case from the running away of defendant's team
might, we think, reasonably have been expected to occur by the running
away of the team, under similar circumstances, in the principal business
street of a town ....

"

In Draves v. Minneapolis & St. Paul Suburban R. R., (1919) 142 Minn.
321, 172 N. W. 128, defendant ran its car too fast without proper warning
signals. Plaintiff's companion, an elderly, heavy woman, with some infirmity
affecting her walk, was crossing the tracks; plaintiff, who had crossed and
was in a position of safety, stepped back to rescue her, and was struck by

the car. It was held, without discussion, that defendant's negligence was

the proximate cause of the injury.
Accord, Eckert v. Long Island Ry., (1871) 43 N. Y. 502; Corbin v.
Philadelphia, (1900) 195 Pa. St. 461, 45 Atl. 1070; Sherman v. United
Rys., (1919) 202 Mo. App. 39, 214 S. W. 223; Gillilan v. Portland Cremation Ass'n, (1926) 120 Or. 286, 249 Pac. 627; Hutton v. Link Oil Co., (1921)
108 Kan. 197, 194 Pac. 925; Liming v. Illinois Central R. R., (1890) 81
Iowa 246, 47 N. Y. 66. See note, (1935) 8 So. Cal. L. Rev. 159.
See the language of Cardozo, J., in Wagner v. International Ry., (1921)
232 N. Y. 176, 180, 133 N. E. 437: "Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions
of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as
normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural and probable.
The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperilled victim; it is a
wrong also to his rescuer.... The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton,
is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer
may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if
he had."
l 2 Goss v. Goss, (1907) 102 Minn. 346, 113 N. W. 690; Fields v. Mankato Elec. Traction Co., (1911) 116 Minn. 218, 133 N. W. 577. See Restatement, Torts, sec. 457, distinguishing between risks normally recognized as
ordinarily incident to medical treatment, and unusual misconduct of
physicians and hospital attendants.
A related problem is involved in cases where the plaintiff's physical
condition causes a later accident. Thus in Hyvonen v. Hector Iron Co.,
(1908) 103 Minn. 331, 115 N. W. 167, plaintiff's leg was broken by the fall
of a skip in defendant's mine. Several weeks afterward plaintiff fell while
walking on crutches from his boarding house to the hospital, and broke his

leg again in the same place. "It was for the jury to say whether the second
break was a direct result of the first." Cf. Sporna v. Kalina, (1931) 184
Minn. 89, 237 N. W. 841, 76 A. L. R. 1280, where the second fall was due
to plaintiff's own negligence. See Restatement, Torts, see. 460.
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since they are within ordinary experience, and so closely connected with the original risk as to be considered a part of it. It is cases
of this type which have led Professor Boblen1' and the Restatement' to say that the intervening force need not be "foreseeable"
to the defendant, but that it is sufficient if, looking back at the
event, it is to be regarded as "normal," or "not extraordinary."
The distinction is a subtle one, and seems to be a matter of definition. Perhaps it would be less confusing to retain the word
"foreseeable," which has been used consistently by the courts, but
with the understanding that it includes all risks and results normaly incident to a dangerous situation created by the defendant.
Where the intervening force is the negligent act of a third
person, it will not break the causal connection if it should have
been "foreseen" within this definition. Nothing is better settled
in Minnesota than that the defendant's fault may consist in exposing the plaintiff to the risk of injury through the negligence of
others. The boy who mishandles a gun,' 24 the train run without
a proper lookout,"2 the employee who brings fire in contact with
2
dynamite,"1
the negligently driven automobile upon the highway,"

7

and many other forms of negligence," 2 8 all have been held

to be foreseeable, and part of the original risk. Defendant is required to anticipate the ordinary, common failure of others to use
122Bohlen, Review of Harper, Treatise on the Law of Torts, (1934) 47
Harv.8 L. Rev. 556, 557.
" Restatement, Torts, secs. 442 (b), 443-447, 451.
"2Anderson v. Settergren, (1907) 100 Minn. 294, 111 N. W. 279;
Kunda v. Briarcombe Farm, (1921) 149 Minn. 206, 183 N. W. 134.
125Martin v. North Star Iron Works, (1884) 31 Minn. 407, 18 N. W.
109. 8
" Anderson v. Smith, (1908) 104 Minn. 40, 115 N. W. 743; Froeberg
v. Smith,
(1908) 106 Minn. 72, 118 N. W. 57.
127 Fairchild v. Fleming, (1914) 125 Minn. 431, 147 N. W. 434; Holmberg v. Villaume, (1924) 158 Minn. 442, 197 N. W. 849, discussed in note,
(1925) 9 MINNEsoTA LAW REviw 273; Setosky v. Duluth, S. S. & A. Ry.,
(1927) 173 Minn. 7, 216 N. W. 245; Edblad v. Brower, (1929) 178 Minn.
465, 227 N. W. 493; Brown v. Murphy Transfer & Storage Co., (1933) 190
Minn. 81, 251 N. W. 5; Dragotis v. Kennedy, (1933) 190 Minn. 128, 250
N. W.8 804; Wedel v. Johnson, (1936) 196 Minn. 170, 264 N. W. 689.
" Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., (1909) 107 Minn. 104,
119 N. W. 428 (dealer reselling defective goods) ; Ellis v. Lindmark, (1929)
177 Minn. 390, 225 N. W. 395 (same); Johnson v. Northwestern Tel. Exch.
Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 433, 51 N. W. 225 (defendant notified that a third
party intended to cut the guy wires of its pole) ; Gillespie v. Great Northern
Ry., (1913) 124 Minn. 1, 144 N. W. 466 (blasting); Wickham v. Chicago,
St. P. M. & 0. Ry., (1910) 110 Minn. 74, 124 N. W. 639 (workmen dropping car sills); Fox v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. Ry., (1913) 121 Minn.
511, 141 N. W. 845 (child getting off of train when station was called and
train stopped too soon); Holz v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. R., (1929) 176
Minn. 575, 224 N. W. 241 (employee going between cars when coupler
would not open).
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due care, which experience indicates as not unlikely to follow in
the situation created. 129 "It is not due care to depend upon the
exercise of care by another when such reliance is accompanied
by obvious danger." 180 A defendant may even be required to
protect the plaintiff against the intentional or even criminal acts of
a third party, in situations where the risk of such conduct should
be foreseen. 1' 1 Few such cases have arisen in Minnesota,"8 2 but
the principle seems to be clear. All such cases may involve the
problem of shifting responsibility, which is considered below.
Professor Beale 8 3 has pointed out that, even though the intervening force may be foreseeable, defendant should not be liable for
its effects unless his conduct has increased the risk of injury
through its intervention. A wind may be expected to blow at any
time, and it might injure the plaintiff in a hundred different ways;
but defendant is not liable for its effects unless he sets a fire or
does some other act which increases the foreseeable danger that
the wind will do harm. If defendant leaves a piece of tin lying
on the ground, and a wind later blows it into plaintiff's eye, the
wind may be foreseeable, but there is no liability unless the position of the tin has appreciably increased the foreseeable risk that
the wind would cause injury. 8 4 Railway trainmen are subject
to a constant risk of falling off of trains, but the company is not
liable for such an injury unless its negligence has increased the
danger. 3 5 The principle never has been stated expressly by the
129Harper, Law of Torts, sec. 123, p. 274; Restatement, Torts, sec. 447.
'8810 Dragotis v. Kennedy, (1933) 190 Minn. 128, 250 N. W. 804.
Restatement, Torts, sec. 449; Hines v. Garrett, (1921) 131 Va. 125,
108 S.E. 690; Brower v. New York Central R. R., (1913) 91 N. J. L.
190, 103 At. 166, 1 A. L. R. 734; Jones Co. v. State, (1923) 122 Me. 214,
119 At!.
577.
1321n Garceau v. Engel, (1926) 169 Minn. 62, 210 N. W. 608, defendant
left a key in the door of a shop in which plaintiff's goods were stored, and
the goods were stolen. Apparently it was -assumed that the intervening
force did not relieve defendant of liability.
In Mastad v. Swedish Brethren, (1901) 83 Minn. 40, 85 N. W. 913,
defendant, holding a picnic, was held liable for failure to protect a business
invitee against assault by an intoxicated perscn. Cf. Johnson v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 433, 51 N. W. 225, aff'd (1893)
54 Minn. 37, 55 N. W. 829. See (1933) 17 MINNESOrA LAw REvmEw 671.
38 8 Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, (1920) 33 Harv. L.
Rev. 8633.
' 4 Cf. Rex v. Gill, (1719) 1 Stra. 190; Central of Georgia Ry. v. Price,
(1898) 106 Ga. 176, 32 S. E. 77; Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Daniels,
(1924) 135 Miss. 33, 99 So. 134.
'351n Goneau v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1922) 154 Minn.
1, 191 N. W. 279, defendant ran a train with a defective coupler, in violation of the Safety Appliance Act. Plaintiff fell from a bridge, either while
engaged in making the coupling, or afterward. It was held that the jury
should have been instructed that plaintiff could recover only if he fell while
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Minnesota court, but there are cases 136 which apparently are to be

explained on this basis.
B. Unforeseeable Force, Unforeseeable Result. If the defendant can foresee neither any danger of direct injury, nor any risk
from an intervening force, he is simply not negligent. Negligence
cannot be predicated upon a failure to anticipate that lightning
will strike a tree and enter a house over telephone wires, 37 that
extraordinary and unprecedented rainfall will flood the streets, 38
making the coupling. The court said that the fall was "direct" and "foreseeable" if it occurred while making the coupling, but not otherwise. It
seems clear that the decision must be justified on the ground that defendant's
negligence did not increase the risk, if not on the ground that the statute
was intended to give protection only against injuries received while making
couplings.
A similar case is Bohm v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1924) 161 Minn.
74, 200 N. W. 804, where a brakeman, on his way to release a defective
brake, stepped off a ladder at the side of the car in the dark, and fell
through a bridge. The court cited the Goneau Case, and said: "Wvhile the
defect furnished the occasion for him to go along the top of the cars, it
did not produce the condition, nor bring into operation a force, which
caused him to fall.... If plaintiff had alighted in the same manner at the
same place for the purpose of boarding the caboose, as it passed, or for
any other purpose, the result would have been the same."
Contrast the cases of Otos v. Great Northern Ry., (1915) 128 Minn.
283, 150 N. W. 922, and Schendel v. Chicago Great Western R. R., (1924)
159 Minn. 166, 198 N. W. 450, 199 N. W. 111, where an employee going
between the cars because of a defective coupler was injured by a movement
of the cars. In such a case, it is obvious that the risk of injury through
the intervening force has been increased.
13 1n Denson v. McDonald, (1919) 144 Minn. 252, 175 N. W. 108,
defendant parked his car within 20 feet of a hydrant, in violation of an
ordinance, and it was struck by defendant's negligently driven truck and
pushed into the hydrant. The court said that the place of parking "was the
occasion but not in the legal sense a contributory cause of the injury ...
If the plainitff's auto had been injured by a fire truck coming to the hydrant
for water service, the result might have been different."
In Geizen v. Luce, (1932) 185 Minn. 479, 242 N. W. 8, defendant
parked a disabled vehicle on the highway. One car tried to pass it, and a
second car tried to pass the first, and was compelled to turn into the ditch
on meeting an oncoming car. It was held that the defendant's act was not
the proximate cause. "The act of passing the [parked] car involved nothing
not incidental to passing it while moving except that he would normally be
able to pass a standing car more quickly than if it were moving." See also
the cases
cited in footnote 135.
13TAlling v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., (1923) 156 Minn. 60, 194
N. W. 313 (the court rejected the contention that the wire might have been
expected to get into somebody's eye, or scratch him and cause bloodpoisoning) ; cf. Parmelee v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., (1908) 103 Minn. 536,
115 N. W. 135.
' 38 Taubert v. City of St. Paul, (1897) 68 Minn. 519, 71 N. W. 664;
Power v. Village of Hibbing, (1930) 182 Minn. 66, 233 N. W. 597; Hanson
v. City of Montevideo, (1933) 189 Minn. 268, 249 "N.W. 46. Contrast the
cases of Van Wilgen v. Albert Lea Farms Co., (1929) 176 Minn. 339, 223
N. W. 301, and National Weeklies, Inc. v. Jensen, (1931) 183 Minn. 150,
235 N. W. 905, where it was to be anticipated that ordinary rainfall would
cause injury.
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that workmen will find a gun and shoot themselves,"' 9 that a child
will pick up a plank with a nail in it and drop it on his foot, 1"0 or
similar unusual and improbable occurrences."' Negligence is a
failure to use due care in view of the foreseeable risk.14 2 But
' 39 Larson v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Ry., (1919) 142 Minn. 366,
172 N.0 W. 763.
14 Spiering v. City of Hutchinson, (1921) 150 Minn.305, 185 N. W. 375.
"4'Freeberg v. St. Paul Plow-Works, (1892) 48 Minn. 99, 50 N. W.
1025 (flying object knocked belt out of machine); Johanson v. Howells,
(1893) 55 Minn. 61, 56 N. W. 460 (playful colt injured on sharp post);
La Londe v. Peake, (1901) 82 Minn. 124, 84 N. W. 726 (frightened horse
backing into depression) ; Frisk v. Cannon, (1910) 110 Minn. 438, 126 N. W.
67 (dissenting opinion of Jaggard, J., where plaintiff was burned by an
apparently safe electrostatic machine) ; Simek v. Korbel, (1911) 114 Minn.
533, 131 N. W. 1134 (defendant held a ribbon across the street to stop a
wedding procession, and one carriage ran into another) ; Briglia v. City of
St. Paul, (1916) 134 Minn. 97, 158 N. W. 794 (automobile backed over
cliff on wide highway); Kieffer v. Wisconsin Ry., Light & Power Co.,
(1917) 137 Minn. 112, 162 N. W. 1065 (uninsulated wires on top of twostory building where presence of people could not .be anticipated) ; O'Keefe
v. Dietz, (1919) 142 Minn. 448, 172 N. W. 696 (stone projecting /2 inch
over sidewalk); Fitzpatrick v. Rose Donahue Realty Co., (1922) 151
Minn. 128, 186 N. W. 141 (child getting slacked lime into her eye);
McDonnell v. St. Paul Union Depot Co., (1923) 157 Minn. 66, 195 N. W.
538 (plaintiff tripped on slight defect in temporary stairway) ; Kennedy v.
Hedberg, (1924) 159 Minn. 76, 198 N. W. 302 (defendant parked his
car with the motor running, and a companion who could not drive it attempted
to move it; the opinion goes off on "causation," but it seems clear that
there was no negligence); Sullivan v. Minneapolis Street Ry., (1924) 161
Minn. 45, 200 N. W. 922 (truck started up ahead of defendant's street
car, necessitating sudden emergency stop); Bunten v. Eastern Minnesota
Power Co., (1929) 178 Minn. 604, 228 N. W. 332 (uninsulated power line
25 feet above a spur track; a workman on the boom of a road building
machine 20 feet high came in contact with it); Shepley v. Minneapolis
Motor Bus Terminal Co., (1930) 180 Minn. 84, 230 N. W. 264 (plaintiff
pushed off of bus platform by crowd); Kruchowski v. St. Paul City Ry.,
(1934) 191 Minn. 454, 254 N. W. 587 (plaintiff forced into path of street
car by negligent motorist; cf. Winchell v. St. Paul City Ry., (1902) 86
Minn. 445, 90 N. W. 1050).
Compare the cases holding that there is no "attractive nuisance" where
children cannot reasonably be expected to interfere, or should appreciate the
danger. Stendal v. Boyd, (1898) 73 Minn. 53, 75 N. W. 725; Erickson
v. Great Northern Ry., (1900) 80 Minn. 60, 84 N. W. 462; Dahl v. Valley
Dredging Co., (1914) 125 Minn. 90, 145 N. W- 796; Brown v. City of
Minneapolis, (1917) 136 Minn. 177, 161 N. W. 503; Erickson v. Minneapolis St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1925) 165 Minn. 106, 206 N. W. 889. Cf.
Twist v. Winona & St. Peter R. R., (1888) 39 Minn. 164, 39 N. W. 402,
12 Am. St. Rep. 626.
In cases involving a violation of statute, there may be no negligence,
although the intervening force is foreseeable, because the statute was not
intended to give protection against the particular risk. Frisch v. Chicago
Great Western Ry., (1905) 95 Minn. 398, 104 N. W. 228.
142In Tracey v. City of Minneapolis, (1932) 185 Minn. 380, 241 N. W.
390, the defendant maintained a bridge with a 17 foot driveway and a 7 inch
curb. Plaintiff's automobile collided with another, and went over the curb
and off of the bridge. The defendant was held not to be negligent: "Accidents of this character are of such remote and improbable occurrence that
negligence cannot be founded upon failure to maintain a barrier to adequately
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once the defendant's negligence is established, because injury of
some kind was to be anticipated, intervening forces which could
not reasonably be foreseen may cause results of an entirely different kind. The problem then becomes one of whether the defendant
is to be relieved of liability by an independent cause which was in
no way within the scope of his original fault.
The Minnesota court has had more difficulty with this problem
than with any other, and it seems impossible to harmonize the
decisions. So far as the numerical weight of the cases is concerned,
the court has taken the position that the defendant is not liable for
the consequences of such intervening forces. It is not reasonably
to be anticipated that a cow on an unfenced right of way will
knock the plaintiff under a train ;143 that boys on the same right of
way will start cars down a grade ;144 that a boy will get past the
flagman at a crossing, and try to climb on a moving train ;14' that
workmen will violate express orders;1" that an injured man will
attempt to go down cellar steps on crutches,'147 or take a trip to
California for his health ;148 that an irrational patient in a hospital
will climb out the top of a window, the lower half of which is
barred ;149 that unmarked logs will be lost in a flood negligently
released from a dam. 1 0 These and other unforeseeable intervening forces' 5' have been held to "break the causal connection."
resist the applied force."- The court went further and held that there was no
proximate causation. It would seem that the better ground would be that
defendant used due care in view of the foreseeable risk. Cf. Briglia v.
City of
St. Paul, (1916) 134 Minn. 97, 158 N. W. 794.
143 Schreiner v. Great Northern Ry., (1902) 86 Minn. 245, 90 N. W. 400.
The court held that plaintiff was not protected by the fencing statute, but
said that even if he were an invitee, the defendant could not be required to
anticipate
"so unusual and peculiar a combination of circumstances."
144 Paquin v. Wisconsin Central Ry., (1906) 99 Minn. 170, 108 N. W. 882.
' 45 Mehaler v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1908) 105 Minn.
128, 117 N. W. 250.
146Green v. Brainerd & Northern Minn. Ry., (1902) 85 Minn. 318, 88
N. W. 974; Schendel v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1924) 158 Minn. 378.
197 N. W. 744.
147Sporna v. Kalina, (1931) 184 Minn. 89, 237 N. W. 841, 76 A. L. R.
1280. 8
14 Benoe v. Duluth Street Ry., (1917) 138 Minn. 155, 164 N. W. 662
(on the showing made, such expenses held not "the natural and proximate
consequences
of the wrongful act complained of.")
45
Mesedahl v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, (1935) 194 Minn. 198, 259
N. W. 819. Cf. Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, (1920) 144
Minn. 392, 175 N. W. 699, where the patient's jump out of the window was
held to be foreseeable.
150 Cotton Lumber & Merc. Co. v. St. Louis River Dam & Imp. Co..
(1911) 115 Minn. 484, 132 N. W. 1126 (contributory negligence).
' 55 Swinfin v. Lowry, (1887) 37 Minn. 345, 34 N. W. 22 (assault committed by a minor, to whom defendant gave liquor); Carsten v. Northern
Pac. R. R., (1890) 44 Minn. 454, 47 N. W. 49, 9 L. R. A. 688, 20 Am. St.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

The justification of these decisions seems to rest upon an
instinctive feeling that it would be unfair to hold the defendant
responsible. A defendant who acts upon a set stage may be expected to take existing conditions as he finds them, and to be held
liable for all consequences directly produced by his acts, whether
or not he could anticipate them. It is another matter to charge
him with subsequent changes in the situation, brought about by
an independent force, of later origin, in no way to be attributed to
his negligence. The boundaries of direct causation are relatively
simple, and limited, not by foreseeability, but by the conditions
existing at the time of the defendant's act; the possibilities of unforeseeable intervening forces are virtually unlimited.
Nevertheless, there are cases in Minnesot which have held the
defendant liable for the results of an unforeseeable intervening
force. Chief among these is Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. 152 Defendant carrier negligently failed
Rep. 589 (plaintiff was wrongfully put off of defendant's train, and lost
possible employment); Weisel v. Eastern Ry., (1900) 79 Minn. 245, 82
N. W. 576 (railway workman on engine tender dislodged a lump of coal;
probably the case holds that there was no negligence); Howley v. Scott,
(1913) 123 Minn. 159, 143 N. W. 257 (plaintiff's land was sold for taxes;
defendant failed to list it as sold and plaintiff did not redeem because of
lack of notice; plaintiff's failure to pay the taxes held not the proximate
cause) ; Swaney v. Crawley, (1916) 133 Minn. 57, 157 N. W. 910 (interference with contract; bonus paid to obtain the benefits of the contract held
not recoverable); Kennedy v. Hedberg, (1924) 159 Minn. 76, 198 N. W.
302 (third party starting car left with engine running; the court discusses
"causation," but apparently there was no negligence); Tracey v. City of
Minneapolis, (1932) 185 Minn. 380, 241 N. W. 390 (see footnote 142);
Hamilton v. Vare, (1931) 184 Minn. 580, 239 N. W. 659 (defendant obstructed the highway, and two automobiles passing the obstruction collided
when one turned in the wrong direction; "the question of intervening cause
need not be discussed"). See also Northern States Contracting Co. v. Oakes,
(1934) 191 Minn. 88, 253 N. W. 371, discussed in (1934) 18 MINNESOrA
LAW REVIEW 877 (increased liability insurance premiums resulting from
killing plaintiff's employee). Cf. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Portland Gas
Light Co., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 801. See also Cochrane v.
Quackenbush, (1882) 29 Minn. 376, 13 N. W. 154, and O'Neill v. Johnson,
(1893) 53 Minn. 439, 55 N. W. 601 (financial loss following malicious
attachment or garnishment).
An interesting case is North v. Johnson, (1894) 58 Minn. 242, 59
N. W. 1012, where defendant made fraudulent representations that he was
authorized to employ plaintiffs at a distance, and sent them there. It was
held that damages caused by privation and discomfort resulting from the
fact that plaintiffs had no money to buy food and pay their fare home, and
so had to walk, were not proximately caused. The court said that if plaintiffs
had been sent out into an uninhabited wilderness, where it would be impossible to obtain food or shelter, or if defendant had known that they had no
money and would be unable to find other work, the damages would have
been the "natural and proximate consequence of his wrongful act:' Cf.
Schumaker v. St. Paul & Duluth R. R., (1891) 46 Minn. 39, 48 N. W.
559.
152(1905) 94 Minn. 269, 102 N. W. 709, 69 L. R. A. 509, 3 Ann. Cas.
450, 100 Am. St. Rep. 361.
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to turn over a carload of broom corn, consigned to Minneapolis,
to a connecting carrier. While the shipment was delayed in defendant's yards at Kansas City, it was damaged by a flood, which
was conceded to be unprecedented, and beyond the reasonable
anticipation of the most prudent residents of the vicinity. It was
held that defendant was liable, because "its neglect concurred and
mingled with an act of God" to bring about the result. 53 Three
later decisions have made statements to the same effect. 5 '
It is permissible to inquire to what lengths the court would
carry the doctrine of the Bibb Broom Corn Case. The fact of
causation is of course reasonably clear: without the delay caused
by the defendant, the shipment would have been beyond the reach
of the flood, and would not have been damaged. But the flood
was not to be anticipated, and defendant's negligence did not increase the risk. Since it could not be foreseen, it was equally
likely to damage the goods at any time or place. Suppose defendant, after the delay, had turned the car over to the connecting carrier, and at the Minnesota line it had been struck by
lightning? Suppose even that it had reached the consignee, still
ten days behind schedule-that is, with the defendant's delay still
113"As a general rule, applicable to all cases of negligence, if damage
is caused by the concurrent force of defendant's neglect and some other
cause for which he is not responsible, including an act of God, he is nevertheless liable if his negligence is one of the proximate causes of the injury
complained of, even though, under the particular circumstances, he was not
bound to anticipate the interference of the intervening force which concurred
with his own. . . . If, but for his negligence, the loss would not have
occurred, no sound reason wll excuse him, and he should not be relieved
by an application of the abstract principles of the law of proximate cause.
No wrongdoer should be allowed to apportion or qualify his own wrong;
and, if a loss occurs while his wrongful act is in operation and force, and
which is attributable thereto, he should be held liable." Bibb Broom Corn
Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., (1905) 94 Minn. 269, 271, 275,
102 N. W. 709, 69 L. R. A. 509, 3 Ann. Cas. 450, 100 Am. St. Rep. 361.
154Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1920) 146 Minn.
430, 179 N. W. 45 (fire spread by gale of wind reaching. 76 miles an hour) ;
Van Wilgen v. Albert Lea Farms Co., (1929) 176 Minn. 339, 223 N. W.
301 (property flooded by unprecedented rainfall) ; National Weeklies, Inc. v.
Jensen, (1931) 183 Minn. 150, 235 N. W. 905 (same). The language in
the first of these cases seems to be dictum, since the court considered that
the wind was foreseeable. The last two might be explained upon the basis
that the injury which resulted was no different in kind from that to be
expected from a foreseeable intervening force. See the discussion below
in part C, p. 53.
Another decision which apparently permits the plaintiff to recover
where defendant's negligence concurred with an unforeseeable intervening
force, is Wallin v. Eastern Ry., (1901) 83 Minn. 149, 86 N. W. 76, 54
L R. A. 481, where defendant's handcar, with one front handle missing,
was so operated by its employees as to derail another handcar. The point
was raised by the dissenting opinion, but the majority ignored it.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

operating-and had been destroyed in his hands by a similar unforeseeable flood? It is difficult to believe that the defendant
would ever be held liable for such occurrences; and yet no reasonable basis of distinction is to be perceived. 155
It may be suggested, with deference, that the time has come
when the court might well overrule the Bibb Broom Corn Case.
It is out of line with the weight of authority, and has beeft rejected by the Restatement. 15 6 It is contrary to the rule of the
57
federal courts, and cannot be applied to interstate commerce,
so that recovery may depend upon the entirely fortuitous circumstance that the shipment did not cross a state line.'"8 It seems
incapable of being reconciled with at least one other Minnesota
decision, written by the same judge, involving an unforeseeable
act of God.' 5 It is not easy to justify upon any familiar prin155The case might perhaps be justified upon the ground that defendant
was a carrier, and there is an analogy in the rule that a deviation from
the designated route makes the carrier an insurer of safe delivery. See
Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. v. The Reeves Coal Co., (1921) 148
Minn. 196, 181 N. W. 335. But the decision does not rest upon any such
ground, and states a general rule as to unforeseeable intervening forces; and
it has been cited in later cases which did not involve carriers of goods.
See footnote 154.
Cases involving foreseeable intervening forces, such as ordinary changes
in the weather, are of course to be distinguished. Fox v. Boston & Maine
R. R., (1889) 148 Mass. 220, 19 N. E. 222, 1 L. R. A. 702; cf. White v.
Minneapolis & Rainy River Ry., (1910) 111 Minn. 167, 126 N. W. 533.
isoRestatement, Torts, sec. 451. The explanatory note to the tentative
draft of this section, Restatement, Torts, Tentative Draft No. 8, p. 111,
states that some fourteen states follow the rule of the Bibb Broom Corn
Case as to a carrier's liability for acts of God, while some thirty-two are
opposed to it-citing 10 C. J. sec. 154, 155.
15TNorthwestern Consolidated Milling Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R.,
(1917) 135 Minn. 363, 160 N. W. 1028, cert. denied (1917) 245 U. S. 644,
38 Sup. Ct. 8, 62 L. Ed. 528 (holding that under the Hepburn Act the
court is compelled to follow the federal rule as to interstate shipments).
158"If for no other reason, the federal rule should be preferred unless
it is clearly against the weight of authority or the necessary implications
of the general principles which determine legal causation. Nothing is more
difficult than to determine whether a particular traffic- movement is or is
not interstate in character. If the rule in any particular state differs from
the federal rule, the rights of the parties must depend upon whether the
goods were lost during an interstate or intrastate traffic movement, with
all the uncertainty and difficulties attending the determination of this question." Restatement, Torts, Tentative Draft No. 8, p. 111.
'59Strobeck v. Bren, (1904) 93 Minn. 428, 101 N. W. 795. Defendant's
property lay between plaintiff's property and a railway. Defendant left
open a gate in the fence between his property and the right of way. A
storm blew down a tree, which fell on the fence between plaintiff's land
and defendant's. Plaintiff's cattle passed through the gap in this fence,
over defendant's land, and through the gate onto the right-of-way, where
they were killed. The case might have been disposed of upon the ground
that there was no negligence, since no injury to others was to be foreseen.
The court said that it need not determine this question, since there was
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ciples of the law of negligence, and it holds the carrier responsible
for a force of nature which is no part of the foreseeable risk

created.'8 0
If the case is to stand as the law in Minnesota, it remains for
the court to explain why a defendant should be held liable for an
intervening storm or flood, and not for other unforeseeable intervening forces. It must be conceded that, apart from the natural
desire of the bar to be able to predict what the court will do, there
is no real reason for consistency in these cases, and that the attempt
to make them a matter of rule is doomed to failure. Various moral

factors and considerations of policy may justify liability in one
case and not in another.161 But no such considerations are evident here. It seems clear that the court never has given full consideration to the problem, for the sufficient reason that it never
has been adequately presented by counsel.
C. Unforeseeable Force, ForeseeableResult. Suppose that the
defendant is negligent because his conduct threatens a result of a
particular kind which will injure the plaintiff; and an intervening
force which could not reasonably be anticipated changes the situation, but ultimately produces the same kind of result ?112 The
problem is well illustrated by a recent federal case. 63 The defendant failed to clean the residue out of an oil barge, tied to a
dock, leaving it full of explosive gas. This was of course negligence, since fire or explosion was to be anticipated from any one
of several possible sources, and might result in harm to any person in the vicinity. A bolt of lightning struck the barge, exploded
the gas, and injured the employees of a contractor working on the
premises. Should the defendant be held liable? It may be asno proximate causal connection. "The death of the cows was not produced
as a natural consequence, without the intervention of an independent or
unforeseen cause or event, by the failure of defendants to keep the rightof-way gate closed." The opinion was written by Mr. Justice Calvin L.
Brown,0 who wrote the opinion in the Bibb Broom Corn Case.
'G Compare the case of Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, (1899) 191 Pa.
St. 345, 43 Atl. 240, where the motorman's speed brought the car under a
tree in time to be struck when it was blown down. Is there any real
distinction?
'6'Discussed at length in Edgerton, Legal Cause, (1924) 72 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 211,
343.
162For example, suppose defendant, in dry weather, runs its train without proper spark arresters on the locomotive. A spark from the engine sets
fire to a field of hay on the south side of the track; a cyclone blows the
fire in a circle of a hundred miles, and a wheat field adjoining the right
of way on the north side at the same point is burned. Is the defendant
liable?
'8 3johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1933) 64
F. (2d) 193.
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sumed that the lightning was an unforeseeable intervening force ;""'
but the result was one to be anticipated, and its foreseeability imposed upon the defendant the original duty to use proper care.
In such a case the result which has occurred is within the scope
of the defendant's negligence. His obligation to the plaintiff was
to protect him against such an accident. It is a comparatively
slight extension of responsibility to hold him liable when the
danger which he has created actually materializes, but in an unforeseeable manner, and as the result of external factors which could
not be anticipated. An instinctive feeling of justice leads to the
conclusion that the defendant is morally responsible in such a case,
and that the loss should fall on him rather than on the innocent
plaintiff.
Yet it seems impossible to generalize upon any such basis.
There undoubtedly are intervening forces whose nature is such
that they supersede defendant's responsibility, even for a foreseeable result. Suppose that A knocks B down and leaves him lying
unconscious in the street, where he may be run over by passing
automobiles, and C, a personal enemy of B, comes along and intentionally runs him down? Or that defendant has excavated a
hole in the sidewalk, and plaintiff is deliberately pushed into it?'"B
Or that a chair is left on the railing of a theater balcony, and a
boy throws it down? 168 Probably no court would hold a defendant
liable in such cases, but it is not easy to discover the distinction.
Intangible factors of moral responsibility are involved, which defy
definition.1 6 7 The Restatement, so far as can be determined from
164 The court labored at some length to say that lightning should be
foreseen, but concluded that the defendant was liable in any case. Cf. Parmelee v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., (1908) 103 Minn. 536, 115 N. W. 135;
Alling v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., (1923) 156 Minn. 60, 194 N. W. 313.
165Cf. Miller v. Bahmmuller, (1908) 124 App. Div. 558, 108 N. Y. S.
924; Alexander v. Town of New Castle, (1888) 115 Ind. 51, 17 N. E. 200;
see Milostan
v. City of Chicago, (1909) 148 Ill. App. 540.
16 6Klaman v. Hitchcock, (1930) 181 Minn. 109, 231 N. W. 716. Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, (1932) 20 Cal.
L. Rev. 229, 396, 471, at pp. 515-520, gives numerous other illustrations, all
of which seem to involve intentional intervening acts, or situations where
there6 was no original duty.
1 7Professor Edgerton, whose thesis is that "justice" is the test of
proximate cause, lays great stress upon these moral factors, and rationalizes
such decisions for the defendant by saying that the interest of society in
discouraging intentionally wrongful conduct is likely to be best served by
denying a recovery against the original wrongdoer, since a judgment against
him reduces the likelihood that the intervening wrongdoer will be made to
answer. Edgerton, Legal Cause, (1924) 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 211, 343, at pp.
344, 364, 367. But see the criticisms of this "justice" test in McLaughlin,
Proximate Cause, (1925) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 149, 187; Carpenter, Workable
Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, (1932) 20 Cal. L. Rev. 229, 244.
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its rather vague language, is willing to hold a defendant liable for
foreseeable results caused by extraordinary forces of nature, but
not for those due to unforeseeable negligent or intentional acts
of third persons.1 68
There are a number of Minnesota cases which have held the
defendant responsible for the foreseeable result where it is caused
by an unforeseeable intervening force, and which apparently cannot be explained on any other basis. The earliest was Moore v.
Townsend,16 9 where defendant left a ladder standing on the sidewalk against a building. It was blown down by an "unusual blast
of wind," and injured plaintiff. It was held, with no discussion
of the problem, that defendant was liable. A line of subsequent
decisions, which dealt with runaway vehicles,'-7 or the intervening
negligent acts of other parties, 7 1 have confirmed this conclusion.
108Restatement, Torts, sec. 442 (a), sec. 451, and secs. 447-449.
169(1899) 76 Minn. 64, 78 N. W. 880. The court said merely: "The
fact that some other cause operated in connection with this negligence could
not relieve defendants from liability. The original negligence concurred
with another cause, and, operating at the same moment, produced the injury."
17 01n McDowell v. Village of Preston, (1908) 104 Minn. 263, 116
N. W. 470, the defendant partially obstructed the street with a building;
plaintiff's horse took fright at a raised umbrella, bolted and ran into the
obstruction, injuring the plaintiff. A verdict for plaintiff was affirmed.
The court said: "Such is the law in this state, whatever may be the rule
elsewhere. It is based on the principle that, where several concurring acts
or conditions of things, one of them a wrongful act or omission, produce
an injury, such wrongful act or omission is to be regarded as the proximate
cause of the injury, if it be one which might reasonably have been anticipated
from such act or omission, and which would not have occurred without it."
Accord, upon the facts, Klaseus v. Village of Kasota, (1914) 128
Minn. 47, 150 N. W. 221; Grant v. City of Brainerd, (1902) 86 Minn. 126,
90 N. W. 307 (but the court left to the jury the question whether it could
be foreseen that a horse would take fright at a bicycle). Distinguish La
Londe v. Peake, (1901) 82 Minn. 124, 84 N. W. 726, which apparently
decides that there was no negligence, since it could not be anticipated that
anyone would fall into the excavation. Cf. Briglia v. City of St. Paul,
(1916) 134 Minn. 97, 158 N. W. 794; Tracey v. City of Minneapolis
(1932) 185 Minn. 380, 241 N. W. 390 (but the court's short statement as
to proximate cause is confusing).
Apparently contra, Lundstrom v. Giacomo, (1935) 194 Minn. 624, 261
N. W. 465 (unless the majority opinion is intended to mean that there was
no causation in fact, since the skidding automobile would have struck
defendant's pier even if it were properly placed?).
171 In Turner v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., (1917) 136 Minn. 383, 162
N. W. 469, defendent failed to maintain a right-of-way fence. Plaintiff's
cattle got onto the right of way, passed over the cattle guards at a crossing,
and along the highway to a farm. The farmer's wife set the dog on them,
and frightened them out of the farmyard and through an open gate onto
the right-of-way again, where they were killed by the train. The act of
the farmer's wife was held not to be such an intervening force as to break
the causal connection as a matter of law; the question was for the jury.
In Palyo v. Northern Pacific Ry., (1920) 144 Minn. 398, 175 N. W. 687,
defendent failed to place any barriers between its tracks and property on
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There is no clear statement of the principle, and there are one or
two cases172 to the contrary, but the weight of the decisions is
decidedly in favor of liability.
which there was a short cut habitually used by small children. Plaintiff's
six year old child was standing close to the tracks, and another boy
threw his cap under a standing train, and pushed him under after it. The
train was started without warning and ran over his foot, inflicting fatal
injuries. A majority of the court were of the opinion that it was a question
for the jury whether the act of the other boy was the sole cause of the
injury.
In Farrell v. G. 0. Miller Co., (1920) 147 Minn. 52, 179 N. W. 566,
the defendant sold gasoline in a can not colored or tagged as required by
statute. A third party placed the can beside other cans containing kerosene.
Plaintiff mistook it for kerosene and was injured. "The act of the farm
hand in placing the can of gasoline beside the kerosene cans in the shed
was not such an efficient cause intervening between defendant's wrongful
act and plaintiff's injury as to free defendant from liability."
In Reynolds v. Great Northern Ry., (1924) 159 Minn. 370, 199 N. W.
108, a freight train was feeding gasoline through a hose into an intake
pipe. A brakeman set his lighted lantern near the mouth of the intake. The
conductor for some unknown reason ordered the pump stopped, and pulled
the nozzle of the hose out of the pipe. Gasoline sprayed onto the lantern,
and a fire resulted which extended along the hose to the tank car. The
conductor ran along the side of the car trying to cut the hose; his clothing
caught fire, and he was burned to death. The court said that whether the
conductor's act in pulling the hose out was the sole proximate cause was for
the jury.
Other cases which apparently are to be explained on this basis are
Musolf v. Duluth Edison Elec. Co., (1909) 108 Minn. 369, 122. N. W. 499
(it is not clear whether the court considers the intervening acts as foreseeable) ; Neidhardt v. City of Minneapolis, (1910) 112 Minn. 149, 127
N. W. 484 (it is not clear whether the automobile is considered foreseeable,
but the court lays stress on the fact that plaintiff would have been compelled
to step out of the way of a carefully driven car) ; Moehlenbrock v. Parke,
Davis & Co., (1918) 141 Minn. 154, 169 N. W. 541; Reichert v. Minnesota
Northern Natural Gas Co., (1935) 195 Minn. 387, 263 N. W. 297 (the
court regarded it as foreseeable that someone would cut out the head of
a paint drum with a chisel; it is easier to justify the case upon the ground
that the explosion itself was foreseeable) ; Wedel v. Johnson, (1936) 196
Minn. 170, 264 N. W. 689.
"Such a cause must be one which not only comes between the original
cause and the injury in point of time, but must turn aside the natural
sequence of events and produce a result which would not otherwise have
followed." Gillespie v. Great Northern Ry., (1913) 124 Minn. 1, 144 N. W.
466.
Cf. also Christianson v. Northwestern Compo-Board Co., (1901) 83
Minn. 25, 85 N. W. 826, 85 Am. St. Rep. 440; Bredeson v. C. A. Smith
Lumber Co., (1904) 91 Minn. 317, 97 N. W. 977; Hill v. Republic Iron &
Steel Co., (1910) 112 Minn. 244, 127 N. W. 925.
172Childs v. Standard Oil Co., (1921) 149 Minn. 166, 182 N. W. 1000.
Defendant filled a mercantile company's tank with kerosene, and permitted
it to overflow into the basement. Employees of the company soaked up the
oil with sawdust, and left oil-soaked. sawdust near the furnace. An occupant of the building, putting fuel on the furnace fire, took a shovel which had
been used to scrape up the sawdust, and tried to shove a stick through the
furnace door. There was a burst of flame, and the building, containing
plaintiff's property, was destroyed. It was held that the intervening acts
of the other persons "insulated" the original negligence of defendant. It is
difficult to agree with this case. Intervening forces of the same general

THE MINNESOTA COURT ON PROXIMATE CAUSE

57

There are two Minnesota cases173 in which an intervening act
of God, unforeseeable in itself, caused damage of the same kind
as that to be anticipated, but greatly increased in extent. The
court apparently has approved the conclusion of the Restatement," 4 that the defendant should be liable in such a case. Perhaps the justification of such a result is the practical impossibility
of separating out the damages, and assigning a part of them to the
intervening force.
It cannot be reiterated too often that any such classification of
the cases is useful only to focus attention upon the problems involved, and that no mechanical solution is possible, and the matter cannot be reduced to a set of rules. It should be evident,
however, that the problem of intervening forces is not so much one
of causation as of the scope of the defendant's original obligation;
and that the "material element and substantial factor" test is of no
assistance in dealing with it.

V. DAMAGES
It has been assumed quite generally by the courts that if the
defendant has proximately caused the plaintiff's injury, and is
liable at all, he must be liable to the full extent of any loss sustained.
Chief Justice Peaslee of New Hampshire, in an extremely interestnature (attempts to clean up the oil, fire from some source) might reasonably have been anticipated, and defendant greatly increased the risk; and
in any case, the destruction of the building by fire was foreseeable. It seems
decidedly unjust to put the loss on the plaintiff, even though there might be
recovery from others.
See also Peterson v. Martin, (1917) 138 Minn. 195, 164 N. W. 813,
where plaintiff's son found dynamite caps left by defendant in his granary:
plaintiff knew the boy had them in his possession, and failed to take
them away from him. It was held that "the father's course of conduct
would break the connection between the original negligent act and the
injury to the boy." Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Promixate
Cause, (1932) 20 Cal. L. Rev. 229, 396, 471, at p. 489, is inclined to disagree with the case. Cf. Mathis v. Granger Brick & Tile Co., (1915) 85
Wash. 634, 149 Pac. 3; Diehl v. A. P. Green Fire Brick Co., (1923) 299
Mo. 641, 253 S. W. 984; Henningsen v. Markowitz, (1928) 132 Misc. 547,
230 N. Y. S. 313.
See also Lundstrom v. Giacomo, (1935) 194 Minn. 624, 261 N. W. 465.
1 3
7 Van Wilgen v. Albert Lea Farms Co., (1929) 176 Minn. 339, 223
N. W. 301 (unprecedented rainfall); National Weeklies, Inc. v. Jensen,
(1931) 183 Minn. 150, 235 N. W. 905 (same) ; cf. Willie v. Minnesota
Power & Light Co., (1933) 190 Minn. 95, 250 N. W. 5. The result, of
course, is in line with Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry., (1905) 94 Minn. 269, 102 N. W. 709, 69 L. R. A. 509, 3 Ann. Cas.
450, 100 Am. St. Rep. 361, discussed above at footnotes 152 ff.
174 Restatement, Torts, sec. 450, stating and approving the case of
Elder v. Lykens Valley Coal Co., (1893) 157 Pa. St. 490, 27 Atl. 545, 37
Am. St. Rep. 742.
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ing article in a recent issue of the Harvard Law Review,175 has
pointed out that this is not always true. The situation which gave
rise to the article arose in a New Hampshire case. 7 6 A boy standing
on the high beam of a bridge trestle lost his balance, and started to
fall onto rocks far below. To save himself, he caught hold of defendant's wires, which were uninsulated, and was electrocuted. It
may be assumed that defendant was negligent, and that its negligence proximately caused the death of the boy. Clearly there is liability; but what is its extent? The loss of balance and the incipient
fall were accomplished facts before the defendant's wrong came
into active operation. What is the life expectancy of a boy falling to
certain death? The court allowed only nominal damages, upon
the ground that his -life had no value at the time the defendant
killed him.
The case suggests that there are situations where a force already
in operation has made the loss certain, or at least very probable,
before the defendant causes it, and that such existing facts are
reflected in the valuation of the loss. It is familiar law that the
fact that a decedent already was dying of cancer will reduce his life
expectancy, and accordingly, the damages recoverable against a
defendant who kills him with an automobile. Then what is the
market value of a house in the path of a conflagration, which the
defendant destroys with dynamite? Suppose that he attempts to
save a building, already undermined by a flood and in imminent
danger of collapse, and in doing so negligently destroys it?
A search of the Minnesota decisions reveals no consideration
of this problem, but a few cases where the point might well have
been raised. A man is seriously ill with diphtheria, and the doctor
negligently lances his throat, causing his death; what was the
value of his life?117 The defendant runs its train over a hose which
is being used to put out a fire in the plaintiff's building, and the
building is destroyed. 8 What is the value of the building at the
time, and does it depend upon the nature of the fire and the extent
175 Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage, (1934) 47 Harv. L.
Rev. 1127.
176Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., (1932) 85 N. H. 449, 163
Atl. 111.
' 77 Clark v. George, (1921) 148 Minn. 52, 180 N. W. 101l.
Cf. Viou
v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., (1906) 99 Minn. 97, 108 N. W. 891, to
the effect that a physician negligently treating an injury is not liable for
damages
caused by the original wrongdoer.
' 78Erickson v. Great Northern Ry., (1912) 117 Minn. 348, 135 N. W.
1129; Bodkin v. Great Northern Ry., (1914) 124 Minn. 219, 144 N. W. 937,
Ann. Cas. 1915B 705. In the latter case the court touched upon the edges

of the point.
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to which it was under control? Plaintiff'is engaged in saving his
stock of goods from a burning store, when the defendant cuts off
the electric current and leaves the store in darkness, and the
goods are lost.' 9. What value should the jury set upon goods
which must be rescued from a fire, in view of the chance of saving
them? In Morris v.St. Paul City Ry., s0 where plaintiff suffered
a miscarriage, the court refused to permit the jury to balance
against the pain suffered from the miscarriage the pain to be
expected from the normal birth of the child, saying that it was
"too remote, speculative and uncertain to be taken as a basis for
estimating damages.' 18 ' Perhaps the future contingency is not
sufficiently certain to be considered; would the result be otherwise
if the miscarriage had occurred three days before the birth of the
child was due?
Reverting to the New Hampshire case of the boy falling from
the trestle, suppose now that the boy had been pushed off by
another person, before coming in contact with defendant's wires.
There are now two responsible causes, upon each of which liability
may be imposed. Should the damages to be charged against the
second be diminished by reason of the certainty of loss created by
the first? So far as the rules of damages alone are concerned, such
a result might be defensible. But the two defendants are joint
tort-feasors, and it is the common law rule that each of two
such wrongdoers is liable for the entire amount of the loss which
they have concurrently caused. The rule is founded upon a policy
which relieves the plaintiff of the necessity of apportioning the
fault between two persons who together have injured him, and
permits him to recover in full from either, leaving them to settle
between themselves the question of their respective responsibility.
Primarily it is based upon convenience of administration. It is
generally agreed that the rule is a desirable one, and that the
unsatisfactory holdings as
fault, if any, lies in the confused and
82
to contribution between tort-feasors.'
'7DMullen v. Otter Tail Power Co., (1915)

130 Minn. 386, 153 N. W.

746, aff'd (1916) 134 Minn. 65, 158 N. W. 732.
(1908) 105 Minn. 276, 117 N. W. 500. Cf. Joyce, Damages, sec. 185.
",'Reference to Respondent's Brief in the case, p. 2, indicates that
plaintiff was pregnant only two months.
182See Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, (1898) 12 Harv. L. Rev. 176; Leflar,
Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, (1932) 81 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 130; Notes, (1911) 11 Col. L. Rev. 665; (1931) 45 Harv. L. Rev.
349; (1931) 16 MINNESOTA LAW lREviw 73. See also Gregory, Legislative
Loss Distribution in Negligence Actions.
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As the law now stands, a plaintiff who has been injured by the
concurrent misconduct of two defendants may recover full damages
against either.1 8 In any question arising between the two wrongdoers,18 4 however, the question of the damages to be charged
against either deserves consideration. And in any case where
there is no joint tort, but the plaintiff has sustained successive,
independent injuries,"8 5 it is clear that the damages should be
apportioned.
Where one of the two concurring causes is of innocent origin,
the rule as to joint tort-feasors has no application, and the question
of the portion of the loss attributable to the wrongdoer might well
be considered. 88 Chief justice Peaslee has opened up a new field
L8 3Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., (1888) 39 Minn. 328, 40
N. W. 160; McClellan v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry., (1894)
58 Minn. 104, 59 N. W. 978; Reader v. Ottis, (1920) 147 Minn. 335, 180
N. W. 117; Patry v. Northern Pacific R. R., (1911) 114 Minn. 375, 131
N. W. 462; Fairchild v. Fleming, (1914) 125 Minn. 431, 147 N. W. 434;
Rappaport v. Stockdale, (1924) 160 Minn. 78, 199 N. W. 513.
84
1
Minnesota permits contribution between joint tort-feasors where the
negligence of each is of a similar nature. Ankeny v. Moffett, (1887) 37
Minn. 109, 33 N. W. 320; Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, (1926) 166
Minn. 388, 208 N. W. 13; see Duluth, M. & N. Ry. v. McCarthy, (1931)
183 Minn. 414, 236 N. W. 766, 767; Mayberry v. Northern Pac. Ry., (1907)

100 Minn. 79, 83, 110 N. W. 356, 12 L. R. A. (N.S.) 675, 10 Ann. Cas.

754. But no contribution is permitted in favor of a wilful and conscious
wrongdoer, from one who has been merely negligent. Fidelity & Casualty
Co. of New York v. Christenson, (1931) 183 Minn. 182, 236 N. W. 618.
Quaere: whether this rule might be extended to prohibit contribution in
favor of one responsible for the greater part of the loss?
' 85 In McGannon v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., (1924) 160 Minn. 143, 199
N. W. 894, plaintiff was employed as a sand-house man under the director
general of railroads for two years and two months, and was then employed
under the defendant railway company for the succeeding seven months. He
suffered injury because of fine sand and fumes escaping from the sand
drier during the entire period. It was held that the director general and the

railway company could not be joined as defendants, since there was no
joint tort. Each defendant was liable only for the injury sustained during
the period of actual employment of the plaintiff. "If the plaintiff's health
was impaired through the negligence of his former employer, and he subsequently sustained further injury through the negligent acts of the railway company, thus aggravating his former injury, the company would be
liable to the extent that its acts aggravated the plaintiff's condition, but the
former employer would not be liable for such aggravation."
It is clear that the court considers the situation the same as if one
defendant had injured plaintiff's foot, causing amputation of the foot, and
the other had injured him later, causing amputation of the leg.
Compare Johnson v. City of Fairmont, (1933) 188 Minn. 451, 247
N. W. 572; Nohre v. Wright, (1906) 98 Minn. 477, 108 N. W. 865, 8 Ann.
Cas. 1071. As to the nature of a joint tort, see Notes, (1931) 19 Cal. L.
Rev. 630; (1924) 24 Col. L. Rev. 891; (1932) 17 MINNEsorA LAw Rvixw
109. 8
' sPeaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage, (1934) 47 Harv. L, Rev.
1127, justifies on this ground the distinction made in the Wisconsin fire
cases, Cook v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1898) 98 Wis. 624, 74
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of inquiry, which has received little attention from the courts. It
goes without saying that the "material element and substantial
factor" test does not aid in the solution of the question.
VI.

SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY

Perhaps the most nebulous and difficult of the problems connected with "proximate cause" is that which, for lack of a better
term, may be designated as the problem of shifting responsibility.
The type of situation involved is illustrated by the recent case of
Ferrarov. Taylor.18 7 The defendant rented an automobile, on the
"drive yourself" plan, to one Taylor. The car had defective brakes,
an accelerator which stuck when pressed down, a loose steering
wheel, and a windshield wiper which was out of order, and it was
a rainy day. After discovering these defects, 88 Taylor continued
to drive the car. He lost control of it while going down grade
N. W. 561, and Kingston v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., (1927) 191 Wis. 610, 211
N.

V. 913.

The Cook Case was rejected expressly by the court in Ander-

son v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1920) 146 Minn. 430, 179
N. W. 45, but it does not appear that the damages point, as to the value of
plaintiff's property at the time of the destruction, was brought to the attention of the court.
Carpenter, Concurrent Causation, (1935) 83 U. Pa. L. Rev. 941, attempts
to refute Peaslee's article, interpreting it as a defense of the "but for" rule,
and a contention that in these cases the defendant has not caused any injury
to the plaintiff. To the writer, it does not seem that this is Peaslee's contention; it is conceded that defendant has caused a loss to plaintiff, and is
liable for it, and the only question is as to the amount of recovery-the value
of what has been destroyed.
187(Minn. 1936) 265 N. W. 829. Accord, Trusty v. Patterson, (1930)
299 Pa. St. 469, 149 Atl. 717. Cf. Mitchell v. Churches, (1922) 119 Wash.
547, 206
Pac. 61, 36 A. L. R. 1132.
88
"In his testimony he described the car as 'a pineapple,' an 'old
melon,' and an 'old wreck;' that 'this car was just like all the rest of them
I ever rented over there. There's none of them in shape.' He 'came near
colliding' with a street car because the brakes wouldn't work. At another
time he thought he would have 'to pretty near put it in reverse in order to
stop.' Another near accident occurred while he was following another car,
the foot throttle stuck and he had to reach down with his hand to raise it.
Fully aware of these many and serious defects he nevertheless continued to
drive this 'old wreck' upon the busy streets of Minneapolis. The weather
was rainy. Because of the claimed defective windshield wiper he had to
stop and wipe off the windshield. Instead of taking the car back to the
service company he thought it was all right to drive it even if it was not
'in shape;' it was not his 'lookout' but the owner's 'hard luck' if anything
happened." Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Julius J. Olson, Ferraro v.
Taylor, (Minn. 1936) 265 N. W. 829.
In this opinion, Mr. Justice Olson lays stress upon the "perverse" and
deliberate character of Taylor's misconduct, as terminating defendant's
responsibility. Cf. Klaman v. Hitchcock, (1930) 181 Minn. 109, 231 N. W.
716; but cf. Johnson v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., (1892) 48 Minn. 433,
51 N. W. 1225, aff'd (1893) 54 Minn. 37, 55 N. W. 829; Garceau v. Engel,
(1926) 169 Minn. 62, 210 N. W. 608; Mastad v. Swedish Brethren, (1901)
83 Minn. 40, 85 N. W. 913.
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over a viaduct, and collided with the plaintiff. The court, with
one justice dissenting, said that defendant was liable, since it had
rented the car for the very purpose of driving it upon the highway,
and the negligence of Taylor was a foreseeable intervening force.189
It may be assumed that the conduct of the defendant in renting the car in such a condition was not due care. If one of the
defendant's servants had driven the car, there could be no doubt
as to liability. It may also be assumed, in accordance with the
opinion, that the acts of Taylor in driving the car with knowledge
of the defects might be foreseen. Certainly the ultimate result, the
injury to a person on the highway, might be anticipated. But the
question remains, whether the defendant is relieved of responsibility by the fact that another responsible individual has taken full
charge of the situation. The question is not one of causation, for
the causal connection is clear; it is essentially one of the termination
of the defendant's original responsibility.
A similar problem is involved in a wide variety of cases. Mention of some of the conclusions of the court will indicate the
difficulty of reducing them to any common principle. A landlord
who leases premises is not responsible for injuries to third persons
caused by their defective condition, 90 unless he has covenanted to
keep them in repair, 191 or knew of a concealed defect at the time
of the lease 192 But if the property is leased for a public purpose,
as, for example, a theater, the landlord's responsibility cannot be
shifted to the tenant;193 and the same is true if the condition of
the premises at the time of leasing constitutes a public nuisance,
or is dangerous to those outside of the property.19 ' Not even notice
to the tenant and his agreement to repair will relieve the landlord
in such a situation. 19 Carriers furnishing defective cars to con18 9 Technically the decision is dictum, since a new trial was ordered because of misconduct of counsel. It should be noted that liability is now
clearly imposed by Minn. Laws 1933, ch. 351, sec. 4, making the driver the
agent of the owner; but the statute was not in effect at the time of this
accident.
19OHarpel v. Fall, (1896) 63 Minn. 520, 65 N. W. 913; Daley v. Towne,
(1914)91 127 Minn. 231, 149 N. W. 368.
19 2Barron v. Liedloff, (1905) 95 Minn. 474, 104 N. W. 289.
1 Ames v. Brandvold, (1912) 119 Minn. 521, 138 N. W. 786; Keegan
v. G. Heilman Brewing Co., (1915) 129 Minm. 496, 152 N. W. 877.
193See Glidden v. Goodfellow, (1913) 124 Minn. 101, 104, 144 N. W.
428; 9cf. Tvedt v. Wheeler, (1897) 70 Minn. 161, 72 N. W. 1062.
' 4Isham v. Broderick, (1903) 89 Minn. 397, 95 N. W. 224.

195 Isham v. Broderick, (1903) 89 Minn. 397, 95 N. W. 224. See (1931)

16 MINNESorA LAw REviEw 111; (1934) 18 MINNEsoTA LAw REVIEw 229.
But cf. Nickelsen v. Minneapolis, Northfield & Southern Ry., (1926) 168
Minn. 118, 209 N. W. 646, which seems to hold that a covenant by a responsible lessee to put and keep the premises in safe condition before permitting
the public to use them may protect the lessor.
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necting carriers or shippers are not absolved from liability to
employees by the employer's failure to inspect and discover the
defect; 298 but the responsibility continues only while the car is
used for the purpose for which it was furnished. 197 A manufacturer who sells defective goods to a dealer is liable for injuries
resulting when the goods are negligently resold without inspection
to the consumer;198 and it is not altogether clear that even the
dealer's discovery of the defect will terminate the responsibility.199
A drug company which supplies impure ether is liable when doctors
negligently administer it and kill the patient. 00° Persons on the
highway may assume that automobile drivers will proceed with
proper care ;201 but the responsibility may not be left to them where
20 2
the situation indicates an especial likelihood of their negligence.
A county auditor who fails to use care to detect a forgery may
19Moon v. Northern Pacific R. R., (1891) 46 Minn. 106, 48 N. W. 679;
Teal v. American Mining Co., (1901) 84 Minn. 320, 87 N. W. 837; Hill v.
Republic Iron & Steel Co., (1910) 112 Minn. 244, 127 N. W. 925; Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Great Northern Ry., (1928) 174 Minn. 466, 219 N. W.
755; Campbell v. Railway Transfer Co., (1905) 95 Minn. 375, 104 N. W.
547; Peneff v. Duluth, Missabe & Northern Ry., (1925) 164 Minn. 6, 204
N. W.
524.
l 97Sawyer v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., (1888) 38 Minn. 103, 35
N. W. 671 (not liable to employees of third carrier to whom car was reconsigned without authority by connecting carrier).
19
SMeshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., (1909) 107 Minn. 104, 119
N. W. 428; Ellis v. Lindmark, (1929) 177 Minn. 390, 225 N. W. 395; cf.
Krahn v. J. L. Owens Co., (1914) 125 Minn. 33, 145 N. W. 626; Farrell v.
G. 0. Miller Co., (1920) 147 Minn. 52, 179 N. W. 566.
199The point was expressly left open in Krahn v. J. L. Owens Co.,
(1914) 125 Minn. 33, 145 N. W. 626, and Goar v. Village of Stephen, (1923)
157 Minn. 228, 196 N. W. 171. Compare Kentucky Independent Oil Co. v.
Schnitzler, (1925) 208 Ky. 507, 271 S. W. 570; Clement v. Crosby & Co.,
(1907) 148 Mich. 293, 111 N. W. 745; Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., (Cal.
App. 1935) 49 P. (2d) 848, reversed (Cal. 1936) 59 P. (2d) 100. See
(1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 493; Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons
Other than Their Immediate Vendees, (1929) 45 L. Q. Rev. 343, 367.
200
Moehlenbrock v. Parke, Davis & Co., (1918) 141 Minn. 154, 169
N. W. 541.
20
Soderberg v. Taney, (1922) 152 Minn. 376, 188 N. W. 993; Klare
v. Peterson, (1924) 161 Minn. 16, 200 N. W. 817; Primock v. Goldenberg,
(1924) 161 Minn. 160, 200 N. W. 920; Bradley v. Minneapolis Street Ry.,
(1924) 161 Minn. 322, 201 N. W. 606; Yorek v. Potter, (1926) 166 Minn.
131, 207 N. W. 188; Pollock v. McCormick, (1926) 169 Minn. 55, 210 N. W.
630. 2
20 Holmberg v. Villaume, (1924) 158 Minn. 442, 197 N. W. 849, discussed in note, (1925) 9 MINNESOrA LAw REmVw 273; Edblad v. Brower,
(1929) 178 Minn. 465, 227 N. W. 493; Brown v. Murphy Transfer & Storage Co., (1933) 190 Minn. 81, 251 N. W. 5; Dragotis v. Kennedy, (1933)
190 Minn. 128, 250 N. W. 804 ("It is not due care to depend upon the
exercise of care by another when such reliance is accompanied by obvious
danger."). Compare the rule that one who has the right of way at an intersection is not relieved of the duty to slow down and keep a proper lookout.
Rosenau v. Peterson, (1920) 147 Minn. 95, 179 N. W. 647.
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not rely upon the treasurer to discover it.2° s An employer may
not leave to others the duty to warn a servant of blasting operations
in the vicinity ;204 but he may assume that the employees themselves
will not disobey express orders. 20 5 A workman digging a hole in
the street may certainly leave it to his superiors to set out a warn206
ing lantern.
The outstanding case in Minnesota is Goar v. Village of
Stephen.2C7 The defendant electric company constructed a transformer pole, under contract with the village. There was evidence
from which the jury might find that the wire leading from high
tension wires to the transformer box was placed too close to
service wires below. The contract required the village, after the
pole was turned over to it, to notify defendant of any defects which
it might be required to make good. The village failed to inspect the
pole for seventeen months, during which time the "sometimes none
too gentle breezes that play over the Red River valley" rubbed the
wires together, and wore off the insulation. Twenty-three hundred
volts came over the service wire into plaintiff's house, and injured
her. The court held that, assuming that defendant was negligent
in constructing the pole, still it was not liable, since the village had
assumed the duty of inspection and maintenance, and defendant
was entitled to rely upon the village. The negligence of the village
was an "independent producing agency of such character that it
broke the causal connection." Stress was laid upon the fact that
the pole was not immediately dangerous when it was turned over,
and that "it took a year and a half of neglect before any injury
resulted. 2 0 8 The cases involving liability of manufacturers to
20
Board of County Commissioners v. Sullivan, (1905) 94 Minn. 201, 102
N. W. 723.
204Gillespie v. Great Northern Ry., (1913) 124 Minn. 1, 144 N. W. 466.
205
Green v. Brainerd & Northern Minn. Ry., (1902) 85 Minn. 318, 88
N. W. 974; Schendel v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1924) 158 Minn. 378,
197 N. W. 744.
206Cf. Jessup v. Sloneker, (1891) 142 Pa. St. 527, 21 AtI. 988.
207(1923) 157 Minn. 228, 196 N. W. 171.
208
"In such a case, the contractor has a right to rely upon the owner's
assuming, immediately upon his acceptance of the work, the duty of inspecOne
tion and maintenance, which confessedly was not performed here ....
of the facts established by the contract is that the village, by the guaranty
clause, assumed the duty, as between the two, of notifying the company of
any defect in the plant which it could be required to make good.... They
could, by contract, adjust their reciprocal duties to suit themselves. ...
How serious and how long-continued must such obvious neglect be, in order
to become an independent cause of injury? Is there no limit of time
beyond which a contractor will cease to be liable, with the owner, for an
injury which could not have happened but for the negligence of the latter?
If the company is liable in this case, there is no rule of law which would pre-
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consumers209 were distinguished upon the ground that the goods
there were presently dangerous when turned over by the manufacturer, and there was no affirmative undertaking to inspect and
maintain upon which defendant was entitled to rely.
Perhaps no common element is to be found in all these cases.
It certainly is not easy to find any one deciding factor. The
essential question, in each case, is whether the defendent is reasonably justified in placing the responsibility upon another, rather
than exercising proper care himself. The foreseeability of the
intervening negligence is important; without it there could scarcely
be liability. But in many cases the defendant is not required to
guard against what is foreseeable, because the responsibility is
not his. It is probable that many factors have weight, and that
no one is conclusive in all cases: the seriousness of the danger, and
the class of persons included within it, the character and position
of the party upon whom reliance is placed,21 0 his knowledge of the
situation, the degree of likelihood that he will not use due care,
the length of time elapsed, the existence of an express agreement,
the situation of defendant and his power of control, and perhaps
many others.
If an attempt must be made to generalize, the cases might be
summarized in some such statement as the following: That where
the defendant is under an obligation to use due care for the protection of a class of persons in which the plaintiff is included, and
may reasonably anticipate that another person will fail to use
proper care if that responsibility is transferred to him, and may
foresee serious danger of injury as a result of such failure, the
defendant is not relieved of his obligation by the fact that the
other has also a duty to use due care. Something of an analogy
might be found in the rules applied to the liability of an employer
vent the same result were the accident to occur 10 years later. If, in tlhe
one case, the company's negligence be a proximate cause, it must be so in the
other." Stone, J., in Goar v. Village of Stephen, (1923) 157 Minn. 228, 236,
196 N. W. 171.
2o0Schubert v. J.R. Clark Co., (1892) 49 Minn. 331, 51 N. W. 1103;
Krahn v. J. L. Owens Co., (1914) 125 Minn. 33, 145 N. W. 626; O'Brien
v. American Bridge Co., (1910) 110 Minn. 364, 125 N. W. 1012; Olds Motor
Works v. Shaffer, (1911) 145 Ky. 616, 140 S. W..1047, 37 L. R. A. (N.S.)
560, 2Ann. Cas. 1913B 689.
oCompare the case where defendant entrusts a gun to a minor. Anderson v. Settergren, (1907) 100 Minn. 294, 111 N. W. 279; Kunda v. Briarcombe Farm Co., (1921) 149 Minn. 206, 183 N. W. 134. Or where an automobile is loaned to another with knowledge that he intends to take it on a
drinking party. Mitchell v. Churches, (1922) 119 Wash. 547, 206 Pac. 6,
36 A. L. R. 1132. But cf. Swinfin v. Lowry, (1887) 37 Minn. 345, 34
N. W. 22.
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for the negligence of an independent contractor. 211 Ordinarily full
responsibility is assumed by the contractor, and the employer is
under no liability for injuries to third persons caused by the contractor's negligence.2 12 But this is not the case where the employer
has a "non-delegable" duty- 2 13 as, for example, the duty to protect persons coming upon his premises- 214 or where the work done
obstructs a highway or creates a nuisance, 21 5 or where the work is
"intrinsically dangerous." 21 6 The employer's liability appears to
rest upon the especial likelihood of injury unless special precautions
are taken. 21 .7 Obviously it is a far cry from such problems to any

question of causation, and the issue is only obscured by discussion
in terms of "proximate cause."
21

1Harper, Law of Torts, sec. 292, pp. 644-652; Restatement, Torts, ch.
15, secs. 409-429; Dunnell, Minnesota Digest, sec. 5835. Cases are collected
in annotations in 18 A. L. R. 853; 23 A. L. R. 984, 1016, 1084; 29 A. L. R.
736;2 12
30 A. L. R. 1502.
Shute v. Princeton Township, (1894) 58 Minn. 337, 59 N. W. 1050;
Schip v. Pabst Brewing Co., (1896) 64 Minn. 22, 66 N. W: 3; Vosbeck v.
Kellogg, (1899) 78 Minn. 176, 80 N. W. 957; Aldritt v. Gillette-Herzog
Mfg. Co., (1902) 85 Minn. 206, 88 N. W. 741; Resnikoff v. Friedman, (1914)
124 Minn. 343, 144 N. W. 1095; Winters v. American Radiator Co., (1915)
128 Minn. 508, 151 N. W. 277; Wallace v. Pine Tree Lumber Co., (1921)
150 Minn, 386, 185 N. W. 500.
21
3Harper, Law of Torts, sec. 292, p. 647.
2
14Corrigan v. Elsinger, (1900) 81 Minn. 42, 83 N. W. 492; Minneapolis Mill Co. v. Wheeler, (1883) 31 Minn. 121, 16 N. W. 698.
21
5Moore v. Townsend, (1899) 76 Minn. 64, 78 N. W. 880, 6 Am. Neg.
Rep. 95; Ray v. Jones & Adams Co., (1904) 92 Minn. 101, 99 N. W. 782,
16 Am. Neg. Rep. 424.
21
GHarper, Law of Torts, sec. 292, p. 648; Restatement, Torts, sec.
427; cf. Carlton County Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Foley Bros., (1912) 117
Minn. 59, 134 N. W. 309; see also Schip v. Pabst Brewing Co., (1896) 64
Minn.
22, 66 N. W. 3.
2
17Cf. Restatement, Torts, sec. 416. One of the earliest statements of
this principle is that of Cockburn, C. J., in Bower v. Peate, (1876) L. R.
1 Q. B. D. 321: "A man who orders a work to be executed, from which,
in the natural course of things, injurious consequences to his neighbor
must be expected to arise, unless means are adopted by which such consequences may be prevented, is bound to see to the doing of that which is
necessary to prevent the mischief, and can not relieve himself of his responsibility by employing someone else-whether it be the contractor employed
to do the work from which the danger arises, or some independent personto do what is necessary to prevent the act he has ordered to be done from
becoming wrongful. There is an obvious difference between committing
work to the contractor to be executed, from which, if properly done, no
injurious consequences can arise, and handing over to him work to be done
from which mischievous consequences will arise unless preventative measures
are adopted. While it may be just to hold the party authorizing the work
in the former cases exempt from liability for injury resulting from negligence which he had no reason to anticipate, there is, on the other hand,
good ground for holding him liable for injury caused by an act certain to
be attended with injurious consequences, if such consequences are not in
fact prevented, no matter through whose default the omission to take the
necessary measures for such prevention may arise."
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Surely enough has been said to indicate that there is no universal solvent or philosopher's stone awaiting the alchemist in the
field of proximate cause. The "material element and substantial
factor" test is adequate as to the problem of causation in fact,
but is of no real assistance in dealing with other problems. The
attempt to find a general formula obscures the existence of separate questions, which have nothing in common. Some further
mention might be made of the frequency with which the court has
discussed in terms of "proximate causation" cases which appear
merely to present questions of negligence, 218 contributory negligence, 219 assumption of risk, 22 0 or the last clear chance, with its
Minnesota equivalent of "wilful negligence." 22 1 But the writer is
inclined to share the conclusion of the earlier note in the LAw
2

See for example Simek v. Korbel, (1911) 114 Minn. 533, 131 N. W.
1134; Kennedy v. Hedberg, (1924) 159 Minn. 76, 198 N. W. 302; Nelson v.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., (1882) 30 Minn. 74 (violation of statute). Compare Benson v. Larson, (1916) 133 Minn. 346, 158 N. W. 426, where the
court disposed of the case upon the ground that plaintiff "was not such a
pedestrian as the statute intended."
It seems clear that there was no
causation.
219
Truntle v. North Star Woolen-Mill Co., (1894) 57 Minn. 52, 58
N. W. 832; Curwen v. Appleton Mfg. Co., (1916) 133 Minn. 28, 157 N. W.
1099.22
Hagglund v. St. Hilaire Lumber Co., (1906) 97 Minn. 94, 106 N. W.
91. 2 2 1
Minnesota does not recognize the "last clear chance" doctrine by
name, but holds the defendant liable if he had a "conscious last clear chance,"
by calling negligence after discovery of the peril "wilful negligence." Evarts
v. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry., (1894) 56 Minn. 141, 57 N. W.
459; Sloniker v. Great Northern Ry., (1899) 76 Minn. 306, 79 N. W. 168:
Rawitzer v. St. Paul City Ry., (1904) 93 Minn. 84, 100 N. W. 664; Havel
v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. R., (1913) 120 Minn. 195, 139 N. W. 137.
The court has recognized the anomaly of such a definition, which is out of
line with the meaning assigned to "wilful negligence" in other states. See
dissenting opinion of Jaggard, J., in Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S.
S. M. Ry., (1908) 103 Minn. 224, 114 N. W. 1123; Gill v. Minneapolis, St.
P. & S. S. M. Ry., (1915) 129 Minn. 142, 151 N. W. 896; Pickering v.
Northern Pac. Ry., (1916) 132 Minn. 205, 156 N. W. 3.
In one or two cases the court has dealt with such "wilful negligence"
in terms of proximate causation. Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry., (1898) 71
Minn. 438, 74 N. W. 166; Rawitzer v. St. Paul City Ry., (1904) 93 Minn.
84, 100 N. W. 664. This seems unsound, since if a third person should be
injured by the negligence of plaintiff and defendant, his injury would clearly
be caused by the negligence of both, and he could recover against either,
even though defendant had discovered the peril, or had a last clear chance.
Why any different conclusion as to causation of the plaintiff's injury? See
Note, (1924) 8 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEw 329.

In Hinkle, v. Minneapolis, Anoka & Cuyuna Range Ry., (1925) 162
Minn. 112, the court seems to have reduced the matter to a complete absurdity by holding that if defendant alone is "wilfully negligent," his negligence is the proximate cause of the injury, but if the plaintiff also is "wilfully negligent," defendant's conduct is not the proximate cause. The
causation would seem clearly to be the same in either case. The conclusion

seems right, but the court in reality is applying a rule of comparative fault,
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that with a surprisingly small number of exceptions, 221
the conclusions reached in the Minnesota cases, upon whatever
theory, are sound and reasonable, and have accomplished substantial justice. The confusion of theories, the variety of approaches,
REviEW 222

22 2

Note, (1932) 16 MINnEsoTA LAW REviEw 829, 847.
22sOpinions as to whether a case is "right" or "wrong" must be a matter
of personal impression, and such impressions may be expected to differ.
The writer is inclined to disagree with the following cases, and to feel that
a different conclusion might have been reached:
Wallin v. Eastern Ry., (1901) 83 Minn. 149, 86 N. W. 76, 54 L. R. A.
481. In the absence of the fellow servant rule, the case might of course be
justified upon the ground that the employees on the second handcar were
negligent, and defendant should be liable for their negligence.
Weisel v. Eastern Ry., (1900) 79 Minn. 245, 82 N. W. 576. The case
seems wrong; but it holds merely that there was no negligence, and in the
absence of a detailed statement as to how the coal/was piled, it is difficult
to quarrel with the court.
Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., (1905) 94
Minn. 269, 102 N. W. 709, 69 L. R. A. 509, 3 Ann. Cas. 450, 110 Am. St.
Rep. 361. See text at footnotes 152-161.
Clapper v. Dickinson, (1917) 137 Minn. 415, 163 N. W. 752. See footnote 115. It is difficult to believe that the intervening forces or the result
could have been anticipated, or that the statute was intended to cover such
injuries. Perhaps the case might be supported on the basis of negligence in
failing to set the brakes on one car, or in shunting the other against it;
but the opinion does not rest upon any such ground.
Peterson v. Martin, (1917) 138 Minn. 195, 164 N. W. 813. See footnote 172.
Childs v. Standard Oil Co., (1921) 149 Minn. 166, 182 N. W. 1000. See
footnote 172.
Lundstrom v. Giacomo, (1935) 194 Minn. 624, 261 N. W. 465, may
hold only that defendant's negligence was not a cause of the injury at all,
since the accident would have happened without it. Cf. Lind v. Great
Northern Ry., (1927) 171 Minn. 486, 214 N. W. 703. If not, the writer is
inclined to disagree, upon the ground that the accident was of a kind which
was foreseeable, even though the intervening force was not.
Guile v. Greenberg, (1934) 192 Minn. 548, 257 N. W. 649, is a troublesome case. Plaintiff was riding on the outside of an armored money truck.
with one foot on the bumper and the other between the fender and the hood,
with his hands on the radiator cap, while the truck was in motion. The
truck collided with defendant's car, which negligently pulled out from the
curb, without any signal, and without a proper lookout. Plaintiff fell from
the truck and was injured. The court, citing the Restatement, Torts, sec.
452 (Tentative Draft No. 10, comment to sec. 3, p. 11), said that the rules
of proximate causation apply to contributory negligence, and that defendant's car was an independent cause which "insulated" plaintiff's negligence, which was not a "material element or a substantial factor" in bringing about the collision. It may be argued that the intervening force was
foreseeable-the court recognizes that the driver of the armored truck might
be found negligent in failing to anticipate it-and it would appear that
plaintiff's position increased the risk of injury in case of such a collision.
Certainly it was a substantial factor in bringing about, not the collision, but
the fall from the truck, which actually caused the injuries. Yet the result
seems right. The writer would have no difficulty in justifying it, if the court
were to adopt the doctrine of the last clear chance-see Restatement, Torts,
sec. 479-which is particularly applicable to cases of this sort. But this
possibility seems to be foreclosed by the case of Kaiser v. Minneapolis
Street Ry., (1920) 147 Minn. 278, 181 N. W. 569,
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the numerous unsuccessful attempts to state fixed and definite
rules, have not obscured what the court has said over and over
again: that "proximate cause" is, in the last analysis, nothing more
than a question of common sense.2 24 The confusion of doctrine is
doubtless of real aid to the court, in permitting some degree of
flexibility, and a just result in each individual case; but by the
same token it becomes more difficult for attorneys to predict what
the court will do. The only suggestion intended here is that a
division of "proximate cause" into separate problems might permit a little more in the way of definite rules, without any real
surrender of "common sense."
22
4Moores v. Northern Pac. Ry., (1909) 108 Minn. 101, 121 N. W.
392; Healy v. Hoy, (1911) 115 Minn. 321, 323, 132 N. W. 208; Farrell v.
G. 0. Miller Co., (1920) 147 Minn. 52, 56, 179 N. W. 566; Childs v. Standard
Oil Co., (1921) 149 Minn. 166, 169, 182 N. W. 1000.

